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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact of managers having a choice of disclosure channels through
which they can voluntarily disclose.
This first chapter presents a model in which the manager can choose to disclose different
information to two different investor types: informed and uninformed. Firm value is ini-
tially established in a competitive equilibrium setting with risk averse investors and noisy
information based on the participants’ expectations of firm value given the manager’s dis-
closure (or lack thereof). Long-run firm value is established through a rational expectations
equilibrium. This paper demonstrates a situation in which the manager will, in equilibrium,
disclose more information to informed investors than to uninformed investors some of the
time. Furthermore, this paper shows that the manager increases overall disclosure when
provided with a second information channel, but decreases disclosure that is quickly parsed
by uninformed investors. As the manager’s optimal strategy is identical for maximizing both
short and long-run stock price, the manager is able to use multiple disclosure channels to
maximize short-run gain without decreasing the long-run stock price.
The second chapter considers the dissemination of information across multiple channels,
and the extent to which the use of multiple disclosure channels affects firm stock price. I
examine two channels of voluntary disclosures: the voluntary portions of SEC filings and
firm websites. Investors appear to react differently to these channels, as SEC filings are
likely to be more costly for investors to process (in terms of both acquisition and cognitive
costs) when compared to firm websites. These textual voluntary disclosures are examined
using a topic modeling methodology to identify two constructs: tone difference, defined as
the extent to which firm websites have more positive disclosure and less negative disclosure
than SEC filings, and disclosure distance, defined as the extent to which the disclosure
topics discussed are similar or different across SEC filings and firm websites. Shifting of
information across channels is identified, as some managers appear to voluntarily disclose
similar information across these two channels, but with more bad news disclosed through SEC
ii
filings and more good news disclosed through firm websites. In the short run, asymmetry
in processing costs leads to investors impounding the good news in firm websites more
quickly than the bad news in the voluntary portion of SEC filings, despite information across
channels being released contemporaneously. I find that managers are incentivized to make
strategic disclosure channel choices through their stock and option holdings. Furthermore,
managers at firms exhibiting strategic disclosure choices sell significantly more stock after
the good news is impounded but before the bad news is fully impounded. Further evidence
demonstrates that low liquidity helps to facilitate the effects of strategic disclosure channel
choices.
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1 Voluntary Disclosure With
Multiple Channels and Investor
Sophistication
1.1 Introduction
The model detailed in this paper directly addresses a concern of Francis, Nanda & Olsson
(2008): determining when managers use different channels of disclosure. By allowing the
manager to choose between two channels and not releasing the information at all, the model
can build a theory for when a manager will choose one channel over another for a voluntary
disclosure.
The model in this paper builds on the basic structure of Dye (1998), a model containing
two investor types with one channel of information. This paper provides a useful comparison
to see how management may make different decisions when given the opportunity to disclose
through multiple channels. Disclosing through multiple channels has become a common oc-
currence, with many companies making disclosures through traditional channels such as SEC
filings and conference calls, as wells as through newer channels such as websites and social
media. As early as 1995, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintained a
policy on electronic disclosure (SEC, 1995). In 2000, the use of firm websites for disclosure
was specifically discussed (SEC, 2000), and in 2013 the SEC approved of the use of social
media networks, such as Twitter and Facebook, as a channel for firm disclosure (SEC, 2013).
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The model takes a basic structure under which the firm is either good or bad, i.e., a market
for lemons (Akerlof, 1970). No one in the model knows whether the firm is good or not, but
the manager probabilistically receives a signal from the firm that follows the distribution of
the firm’s type. This signal could be thought of as a forecast about the potential value of
a follow-on project, or another indicator that should be correlated with firm type but not
correlated with firm value conditional on knowing the firm type. This signal does not tell
the manager the actual value of the firm, but it is useful in determining whether the firm is
good or bad. The manager then has the option to disclose or to not disclose the information
publicly. If the manager chooses to disclose the information, the manager can then choose to
disclose it through an easy-to-process disclosure channel (easy channel) or a hard-to-process
disclosure channel (hard channel). In the short run, informed investors see all information
that was disclosed, while uninformed investors only see the information that was released via
the easy channel. As in Dye (1998), if the manager receives information but chooses not to
disclose it through either channel, then the informed investors are aware that the information
exists, but they do not know what the information is, whereas the uninformed investors have
no information. If the manager receives no information, the informed investors likewise know
this, whereas the uninformed investors again have no information. A diagram of the flow of
information in this system is presented in Figure 1.1.
Under this framework, the manager does take advantage of this second channel when
the manager’s signal is in an intermediate range. Above this range the manager chooses to
disclose in the easy channel, and below the intermediate range the manager will choose to
withhold information. When the second channel is not present, the manager will withhold
information whenever the signal falls below a certain cutoff, which happens to fall in the
intermediate range. This result agrees with the primary result of Dye (1998). After de-
riving the expected management disclosure pattern, general expressions for the competitive
equilibrium price are obtained.
In the long-run, the manager’s disclosure pattern is unchanged. The uninformed in-
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vestors, however, are able to completely discern the informed investors’ information from
the initial price, and thus all investors have the same information in the long run. Overall,
the long-run results imply that managers can use multiple channels of disclosure to increase
firm value in the short run without affecting firm value in the long run.
Through simulation, unconditional expected firm value is examined, as are the dynamics
of the equilibrium price and management actions.
Related literature on informed investors in voluntary disclosure is discussed in the next
section. In Section 1.3, the general structure of the model is described. Section 1.4 derives
the main model and replicates the results of Dye (1998) under the analytical framework
described in Section 1.3. Section 1.5 examines implications of the model as well as the
dynamics of the equilibrium. Lastly, Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs not included inline are
included at the end of the chapter.
1.2 Review of theory
Most of the research on voluntary disclosure focuses on the unraveling result (Grossman
& Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), altering one or
more of the six conditions for full disclosure. The most pertinent element of the unraveling
result to this study is the uniformity of investor response. Suijs (2007) found that violating
this condition while holding all others constant is sufficient to induce less than full disclosure.
A specific variant of violating uniform investor response that has been considered is varying
investor sophistication. Dye (1998) uses rational investors with probabilistic information
acquisition, finding that managers disclose more when investors have a higher probability
of acquiring information. Fishman & Hagerty (2003) demonstrates a model with two levels
of sophistication, where one level is capable of interpreting disclosures and the other only
knows the disclosure happened.
The endogenous model in this study builds upon these models by having two separate
channels of information: an easy-to-process disclosure channel which can be quickly processed
by all investors, and a hard-to-process disclosure channel which can only be quickly processed
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by sophisticated investors. The hard channel can be processed by all investors in the long run,
however. Furthermore, the information that can be quickly processed by the unsophisticated
investors is not determined probabilistically, but is determined endogenously by the manager.
This paper is also related to the stream of literature on limited investor attention. Limited
attention has been modeled in the disclosure literature to examine how investors might react
to different disclosure formats and rules (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003), as well as earnings
news (Hirshleifer, Lim & Teoh, 2011). Empirically, some extent of limited investor attention
has been documented by Dellavigna & Pollet (2009), showing that stock prices react more
slowly to information on Fridays. Likewise, Barber & Odean (2008) empirically demonstrate
that investors are more likely to purchase than sell stocks due to attention grabbing news,
as investors holding the stock are likely to be paying closer attention to firm news. In this
paper, it is assumed that the uninformed investors can only quickly process the easy-to-
process disclosure channel, while the informed investors can quickly process both channels.
While this is a strong use of limited attention, such a strong use is needed to maintain
tractability.
1.3 Model structure
The first model takes place in a one period setting in which there are two types of players,
a manager and investors, as well as two disclosure channels. The model focuses only on one
firm and one manager. The number and types of investors are taken to be exogenous, with
𝑁𝑈 uninformed investors and 𝑁𝐼 informed investors, 𝑁 investors in total. At the start of the
first period, the firm type is chosen to be either good or bad; the firm is good with probability
𝑝𝐺. If the firm is good (bad), its expected value at time 1 will follow a normal distribution
with mean 𝜇𝐺 (𝜇𝐵) and variance 𝜎
2
𝐻 (𝜎
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𝐵). For simplicity, assume that 𝜎𝐻 = 𝜎𝐵 = 𝜎. A
signal 𝑦 exists, such that the signal follows the true distribution of the firm; thus, if the
firm is good, 𝑦 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇𝐺, 𝜎2). It is assumed that the manager knows the value of the signal
with some probability, call it 𝑝, as in Dye (1985), Jung & Kwon (1988), and Dye (1998).
If the manager knows the value of the signal, then the manager can choose whether or not
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to release the signal. If the manager chooses to release the signal, the manager will then
choose which channel to release the signal through. Investors then receive information based
on their type and the channel chosen by the manager, determine their desired amount of
shares at each possible share price, and trade in order to establish a firm price. Note that this
model assumes that the manager does not manipulate the content of any disclosure, as in Dye
(1985), Jung & Kwon (1988), and Dye (1998). Consequently, this model assumes that the
disclosure content must be the same regardless of the manager’s disclosure channel choice.
While this is an idealized case, it is reasonable to assume the same regulations hold across
channels. Per SEC Release No. 33-7856 (SEC, 2000), the disclosing party is responsible for
the accuracy of the disclosures regardless of the medium through which the statement is
made.
1.3.1 Model setup
1.3.1.1 Information
This paper assumes multiple channels of information in the market, as opposed to one
channel. By allowing for multiple channels, voluntary disclosures can have different costs of
access at the manager’s discretion. The general model in this paper implements this by hav-
ing two sets of information, an easy channel and a hard channel. If the two investor groups
have a different ability to process these disclosures, then the manager could potentially use
this structure for personal gain. Given that firm disclosures naturally vary in readability
based on the source, it is quite feasible that disclosure channels will vary in the ease of pro-
cessing across investor types. For instance, annual reports tend to have low readability (Li,
2008), whereas disclosures via social media are likely to be more readable. Based on the
information that the investors receive, a price per share of the firm, 𝑃0, will be determined.
1.3.1.2 Investors
As with the information, there are two types of investors. The first type of investor
(henceforth informed investors) has sufficient processing capability to quickly process all
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information voluntarily released by the manager.1 Consequently, this investor sees all infor-
mation in both channels. Furthermore, this investor type is aware of whether the manager
received a signal or not (as in Dye (1998)).2 The second type of investor (uninformed in-
vestors) is able to quickly process only the information disclosed through the easy channel.
This investor, however, is not capable of quickly processing the information in the hard
channel, i.e., the cost to process the hard channel is too high. All investors’ expected utility
is based on their expectation of the underlying value of the firm, the amount of the stock
they purchase, and the amount of the risk-free asset that they hold. The risk-free asset
is assumed to provide a return plus 1 of 𝑅𝑓 and is perfectly elastic in terms of quantity.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the investors are risk averse, with a utility function follow-
ing constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), and in particular the investors have a utility
function 𝑈(𝑥) = −𝑒−𝑎𝑥, where 𝑎 > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion.3
1.3.1.3 Manager
The model assumes the presence of just one firm with one manager. Inside the firm there
is private information in the form of a signal, 𝑦, related to the expected value of the firm
at time 1. The manager then receives this information with some probability 𝑝 in a noisy
manner, receiving the signal 𝑦 = 𝑦 + 𝜖. The signal 𝑦 follows the distribution for the actual
firm type, which provides information about the firm type in a Bayesian sense. If the firm is
good, firm value at time 1 (𝑃1) and 𝑦 will follow 𝑁(𝜇𝐺, 𝜎
2); if the firm is bad, 𝑃1 and 𝑦 will
follow 𝑁(𝜇𝐵, 𝜎
2). When the manager receives the signal, the manager will decide whether
or not to disclose the information based on the information the manager has, the manager’s
utility function, and the expected interpretation and actions by other market participants.
1Quickly, in this context, is taken to mean within the time-frame between disclosure and trading.
2This condition is required in order to induce partial disclosure, as otherwise the manager has no incentive
to treat the two types of investors differently, as the investor types would be indistinguishable under a no
disclosure case.
3This form of utility is used as it allows for tractability when the information processes described in the
next section are normally distributed.
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If the manager chooses to disclose information, the manager must pick between the easy
and hard channels to disclose through. While the manager could disclose through both
channels simultaneously, doing so is equivalent to disclosing through only the easy channel
in this setting, given the investors’ information acquisition processes. The manager’s utility
is assumed to be risk neutral and linearly increasing in the initial stock price, 𝑃0, of the firm.
1.4 Main model
While deriving the main model, it is helpful to set a baseline by examining a model
with one disclosure channel. Such a model is analogous to Dye (1998). However, the model
in Dye (1998) is under different assumptions. There are four primary differences between
the assumptions detailed in Section 1.3 and the assumptions detailed in the symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Dye (1998). First, this paper uses a trading model, and
consequently includes a risk-free asset along with the risky asset of the firm. Second, the
signal in Dye (1998) is the firm value, rather than a random signal from the firm value’s
distribution. This difference is needed in order to maintain tractability.4 Third, the makeup
of investors is pre-determined, with 𝑁𝐼 informed investors and 𝑁𝑈 uninformed investors.
Again, this assumption improves tractability.5 Lastly, for tractability, firm value follows a
normal distribution as opposed to a general distribution with a weakly decreasing probability
density function (PDF) and investors are risk averse as opposed to risk neutral. These
assumptions flow from the standard setup of a competitive equilibrium market pricing model
(Grossman, 1976). Given these changes, it is important to verify that the base results of Dye
(1998) hold under this new framework, particularly that the manager can have an incentive
4Under the Dye (1998) framework, introducing a second disclosure channel leads to an intractable dis-
tribution of bids for uninformed investors. Likewise, under a standard competitive equilibrium in which the
signal is the firm value, the expected utility under any withholding case becomes intractable as the distri-
bution of expected firm values follow a distribution akin to a product of a normal PDF and normal CDF
weighted to integrate to 1.
5In particular, this assumption removes the need to sum across a binomial distribution to get the expected
investor reactions.
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to not fully disclose to all market participants when some participants are informed and
some participants are uninformed (this is discussed in Corollary 2.1). Under the framework
outlined above, a short run competitive equilibrium can be determined.
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for the model is the set
of manager actions and investor actions covering all possible states of nature, namely whether
the manager receives a signal and, if so, the value of the signal. Furthermore, the manager’s
actions must lead to the highest price 𝑃0 given the optimal actions of the investors, and the
investors must maximize their expected utility with respect to their own information sets. The
uninformed investors’ information set includes whether or not a disclosure was made through
the easy channel, and if so, what the signal was. The informed investors’ information set
includes whether or not the manager received a signal, whether or not the manager disclosed
a signal through either channel, and if so, what the value of the signal was.
This competitive equilibrium can be thought of as follows. Suppose that the manager
understands the structure of the market and strategically discloses to maximize the outcome
of a one period auction in which all shares must be sold. Then, investors use the information
they receive (either the disclosure or the lack thereof), and participate in a silent auction
in which the highest price that clears all market shares is chosen. As such, the investors
cannot obtain information from the auction itself, as the moment any usable information
is generated, i.e., the market clearing price, the auction ends. An extended version of this
auction structure is considered in Section 1.4.3.
Initially, there are four states to consider: a signal is obtained by the manager and
disclosed to all investors (Full Disclosure, 𝐹𝐷), a signal is obtained but is disclosed only
to informed investors (Partial Disclosure, 𝑃𝐷), a signal is obtained and is not disclosed
(Withholding, 𝑊 ), and no signal is obtained (No Information, 𝑁𝐼). As in Dye (1998), the
manager may have an incentive not to disclose if the signal 𝑦 is low enough. This causes the
manager’s non-disclosure signal to not be a credible signal of having no information among
investors. If the manager could credibly contract to disclose the signal at any value of 𝑦,
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non-disclosure could be a credible signal. Without such a contract, there may instead exist a
stable point 𝑐𝑊 at which the manager is indifferent between full disclosure and withholding
when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑊 . Existence of 𝑐𝑊 is equivalent to the manager having an incentive to not
fully disclose under a one channel model. Furthermore, there may be two additional stable
points: one where the manager is indifferent between partial disclosure and full disclosure
(when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷) and one where the manager is indifferent between partial disclosure and
withholding (when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷). These two points, 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷, will define the manager’s
incentives under equilibrium. Thus, all four states are possible in this setup: 3 states when
the manager receives a signal and one when the manager does not.
Before deriving the equilibrium, an existence condition and uniqueness are discussed.
Theorem 1 (Existence of a non-degenerate solution, competitive equilibrium). A non-
degenerate solution for a competitive equilibrium as described in Definition 1 requires a high
value of 𝑦 to be indicative of a good firm and a low value of 𝑦 to be indicative of a bad firm.
A non-degenerate solution exists whenever the manager’s preferred action for all 𝑦 above
some point 𝑦 is to fully disclose. A non-degenerate solution is found whenever the following
condition holds:
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎𝑝𝐺 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
Proof. See Section 1.7.1.
This existence criterion is intuitive. While the expected value of 𝑃1 is greater under full
disclosure for high values of 𝑦, the variance will also be higher. As the investors are risk
averse, they do not only care about the difference in the means, but also in the variance of
the outcome. The price is penalized by a function that is increasing in the risk aversion of
investors and the number of shares available per investor. As risk aversion increases, investors
will decrease their willingness to pay for a share of the firm as they will be less willing to take
on the risk of the asset. Likewise, as the variances increase, investors will assess a greater
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penalty. As 𝑝𝐺 increases, the difference between the expectation of 𝑃1 conditional on 𝑦 and
the unconditional expectation of 𝑃1 decreases. Lastly, as the number of shares in the market
increase, the price of the shares decrease as all shares must be traded in order to complete
the market.
Remark 1.1 (Uniqueness). Furthermore, under the existence criterion, any disclosure pat-
tern by the manager is likely to be unique. However, proving uniqueness under the structure
of this model is particularly difficult due to the lack of monotonicity in the price, 𝑃0, as a
function of the manager’s disclosure choices. Instead, uniqueness is tested in the simulation
in Section 1.5.2. Based on the simulation, any competitive equilibrium under the condition
of Theorem 1 appears to be unique.
Uniqueness follows from the different information sets. Note that under withholding, the
value of the firm to informed investors will be lower than the value of the firm to uninformed
investors, as the informed investors know that the manager received a bad signal. Under
partial disclosure, the relative value of the firm to each investor type will depend on the
signal disclosed. Under full disclosure, information sets are equal across investor types, as
all investors have receive the disclosure.
1.4.1 Investors’ actions
Before solving for the manager or investor actions, the perceived probabilities of ending
up in a state must be defined.
Lemma 1 (Conditional probabilities). When 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷 exist and 𝑐𝐹𝐷 > 𝑐𝑃𝐷, the con-
ditional probability that each investor type 𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝑈} perceives the firm is good under each
state 𝑠 ∈ {𝐹𝐷,𝑃𝐷,𝑊,𝑁𝐼} are given by:
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 =
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐵) ,
𝑝𝐼,𝑊 =
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐵)
,
𝑝𝐼,𝑁𝐼 = 𝑝𝐺,
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𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑃 =
𝑝𝐺 (𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝))
𝑝 (𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐵)) + (1− 𝑝)
,
Where:
𝛽𝑥,𝑇 =
𝑥− 𝜇𝑇
𝜎
,
𝜑(𝑥) =
1√
2𝜋
𝑒−𝑥
2/2,
Φ(𝑥) =
1
2
(︁
1 + Erf
(︁
𝑥/
√
2
)︁)︁
.
Each of these probabilities follows directly from Bayes’ theorem using the underlying
probability distributions of the two firm types as well as the information set known to
each investor type on each disclosure state. Given the above probabilities and that the
distributions under states 𝐺 and 𝐵 are normal, the conditional distribution the firm follows
under a given investor-state pair (𝑖, 𝑠) is given by
𝑁
(︀
𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝑖,𝑠)𝜇𝐵, (2𝑝𝑖,𝑠2 − 2𝑝𝑖,𝑠 + 1)𝜎2
)︀
. (1.1)
For simplicity, assume that all investors have the same starting wealth 𝑊0 and the same
coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑎. The investors’ problem will be to maximize their expected
utility based on the information set they receive, 𝐼𝑖, where 𝑖 denotes the investor type:
max
𝑥𝑖
E
[︁
𝑈(?˜?𝑖,𝑖)
]︁
,
= max
𝑥𝑖
E
[︁
𝑈(𝑅𝑓𝑊0 + (𝑃1 −𝑅𝑓𝑃0)𝑥𝑖)|𝐼𝑖
]︁
.
As 𝑈 is exponential and 𝑃1 is conditionally normal, this is equivalent to:
argmax
𝑥𝑖
𝑎E
[︁
?˜?1,𝑖|𝐼𝑖
]︁
+
1
2
𝑎2V
[︁
?˜?1,𝑖|𝐼𝑖
]︁
,
= argmax
𝑥𝑖
𝑎𝑅𝑓𝑊0 − 𝑎𝑅𝑓𝑃0𝑥𝑖 + 𝑎E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
𝑥𝑖 +
1
2
𝑎2𝑥𝑖
2V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
,
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⇒ 𝑥𝑖 =
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
−𝑅𝑓𝑃0
𝑎V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁ . (1.2)
Once investors’ behavior under a certain state is derived, the initial price can be deter-
mined by aggregating the each 𝑥𝑖 up to the number of shares available, ?¯?.
1.4.2 Equilibrium
Now an expression for the basic behavior under each state can be derived. This follows
from summing equation (1.2) for each investor and setting the sum equal to ?¯?, the total
number of shares available. The resulting equation can then be solved to determine 𝑃0,𝑠.
Likewise, given the optimal strategy for investors to follow, the manager’s strategy can also
be categorized. Thus, the equilibrium can be defined.
Theorem 2 (Competitive equilibrium). Investor actions under each state 𝑠 are given by:
𝑃0,𝑠 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 + 𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2 − 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 +
𝑁𝑈
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2
]︁ ,
where 𝑝𝑖,𝑠 is defined as in Lemma 1.
The manager’s optimal disclosure pattern depends on if the manager receives a signal
and the value of the signal received. If the manager receives a signal, there exists some point
𝑐𝐹𝐷 such that the manager will fully disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐𝐹𝐷, and there exists another point
𝑐𝑃𝐷 such that the manager will partially disclose whenever 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑦 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷. When 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷,
the manager will choose to withhold the signal 𝑦. If the manager does not receive a signal,
the manager will not disclose.
The point 𝑐𝐹𝐷 is characterized as the point at which the manager is indifferent to disclos-
ing to the uninformed investors, and thus it is the point at which the uninformed investors’
expectation of firm value is equal in both the 𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃𝐷 states. Likewise, the point 𝑐𝑃𝐷
is characterized as the point at which the manager is indifferent to disclosing to informed
investors, and thus is the point at which informed investors’ expectation of firm value is the
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same under the 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑊 states.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2 for the derivation of investors’ optimal actions and Section 1.7.3 for
the derivation of the optimal manager actions.
The manager will choose to take advantage of both channels that are available. This
result implies that the availability of multiple disclosure channels affects the information
environment of the market, as the two disclosure channels are used to disclose different
information. Consequently, the existence of multiple disclosure channels may have an impact
on firm stock price formation. To better understand the effect of having a second disclosure
channel, a competitive equilibrium under the same framework is derived when only one
channel, the easy channel, is available to the manager.
Corollary 2.1 (Manager action under 1 channel). If the manager is restricted to have
only one channel to disclose through, and the condition specified in Theorem 1 holds, the
manager’s optimal disclosure pattern still depends on if the manager receives a signal and
the value of the signal. If the manager receives a signal, there exists some point 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 such
that the manager will fully disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐′𝐹𝐷. The manager will withhold the signal
when 𝑦 < 𝑐′𝐹𝐷. If the manager does not receive a signal, the manager will not disclose.
Furthermore, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐
′
𝐹𝐷 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷.
Proof. That 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐
′
𝐹𝐷 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷 is a direct consequence of the ordering in Proposition 2 – since
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 at 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 at 𝑐𝑃𝐷, and since 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝑊 are continuous,
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝑊 must be equal between 𝑐𝑃𝐷 and 𝑐𝐹𝐷. Call this point 𝑐
′
𝐹𝐷. The remainder of
the corollary follows from this.
This result is identical in spirit to the equilibrium in Dye (1998). This allows the man-
agement actions underlying the two channel model can be compared against a one channel
model that is consistent with prior literature. In particular, notice that since 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷, the
manager will choose to decrease disclosure through the easy channel when the manager has
the option of using a hard-to-process disclosure channel. Furthermore, the manager increases
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the overall level of disclosure, as 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐
′
𝐹𝐷. This implies the existence of potential market
efficiencies and inefficiencies from managers having multiple disclosure channels.
1.4.3 Long run implications
To further understand the dynamics of the investor and manager actions in the under-
lying environment, this section considers a multi-period steady-state style equilibrium. In
particular, consider an equilibrium in which investors not only consider the disclosure in-
formation they receive, but also the stock price as determined in the first period, i.e., the
competitive equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Rational expectations equilibrium). A rational expectations equilibrium for
the model is the set of manager actions and investor actions covering all possible states of
nature, namely whether the manager receives a signal and, if so, the value of the signal.
Furthermore, the manager’s actions must lead to the highest price 𝑃0 given the optimal
actions of the investors, and the investors must maximize their expected utility with respect
to their own information sets. The uninformed investors’ information set includes whether
or not a disclosure was made through the easy channel, and if so, what the signal was. The
informed investors’ information set includes whether or not the manager received a signal,
whether or not the manager disclosed a signal through either channel, and if so, what the
value of the signal was. Furthermore, the current price as determined by the investors’ trade
is visible to all parties.
Because the price is visible to all parties, it is possible that the investors may be able
to infer the other party’s information from the price. Because the uninformed investors’
information is a subset of the informed investors’ information, the informed investors cannot
gather any additional information, but the uninformed investors can. In fact, under certain
conditions, it would be possible for the uninformed investors to perfectly determine the
informed investors’ information. In such a case, the equilibrium is said to be fully-revealing.
Theorem 3 (Existence and uniqueness of a fully-revealing rational expectations equilib-
rium). A rational expectations equilibrium will be fully-revealing when the price is a sufficient
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statistic for the information impounded in the price by both parties. In particular, if the price
is strictly monotonic in the signal value when it is disclosed, then the rational expectations
equilibrium will 1) exist and 2) be fully-revealing. This occurs whenever
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2. (1.3)
Furthermore, such an equilibrium will be unique.
Proof. Let 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2 and consider the sign of 𝜕𝑃0𝜕𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 under state 𝐹𝐷:
𝜕𝑃0
𝜕𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝐹𝐷
=
1
𝑅𝑓
(︁
(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵)− 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(4𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 − 2)𝜎2
)︁
> 0,
⇒ 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 < 1
2
(︂
1 +
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵
2𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
)︂
> 1.
Since 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 < 1 by definition, 𝑃0 under state FD is monotonic in 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷. Since 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 is
monotonic in 𝑦, 𝑃0 is monotonic in 𝑦 when 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2.
Showing that 𝑃0 under state 𝑃𝐷 is monotonic in 𝑦 is significantly more difficult ana-
lytically. As such, this is instead demonstrated in the simulation in Section 1.5.3. In all
iterations when 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2, 𝑃0|𝑃𝐷 is monotonic in 𝑦.
Thus, 𝑃0 is monotonic in all situations when there is a signal and it is disclosed. Fur-
thermore, when there is a signal and it is not disclosed, the expected value is identical to
the price when a signal equal to 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is disclosed. Consequently, 𝑃0 is invertible over the set
(𝑐𝑃𝐷,∞)∖{𝑃0−1(𝑃0|𝑁)}. Thus, 𝑃0 is invertible for all but two prices: the price when no in-
formation exists and the price when information is withheld. When information is withheld,
however, the price is identical to 𝑃0(𝑐𝑃𝐷). As withholding occurs with finite probability,
P (𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷) 𝑝, whereas 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷 occurs with probability approximately 0, investors can infer
that if the price is initially 𝑃0(𝑐𝑃𝐷), the manager chose to withhold information. When no
information exists, the price will initially be at some value 𝑃 *0 . As no signal existing occurs
with finite probability 𝑝, whereas, 𝑦 = 𝑃−10 (𝑃
*
0 ) occurs with probability approximately 0,
15
investors can infer that if 𝑃0 equals 𝑃
*
0 , no signal exists. Thus, investors can determine
the available information at every possible price, and consequently a fully-revealing rational
expectations equilibrium will attain. Furthermore, since the price is invertible, the solution
must be unique.
Given the above proof, a rational expectations equilibrium will exist and will be fully-
revealing, so long as the condition in equation (1.3) holds. This means that after observing
the price that attains in the competitive equilibrium, all investors will act as though they
are informed.
Theorem 4 (Rational expectations equilibrium). Investor actions under each state 𝑠 are
given by:
𝑃0,𝑠 =
1
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑝𝐼,𝑠𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐼,𝑠)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2 − 2𝑝𝐼,𝑠 + 1)𝜎2
)︁
,
where 𝑝𝐼,𝑠 is defined as in Lemma 1.
The manager’s optimal action set when receiving a signal is to disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐𝑃𝐷, and
to withhold when 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷. The manager is indifferent between disclosure and withholding
when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷.
Proof. The investors’ action is identical to that of Theorem 2, except with 𝑁𝐼 = 𝑁 and
𝑁𝑈 = 0. This is a direct consequence of all investors acting as though they are informed.
The manager’s action is simply to disclose only when it leads to a higher expected value
than withholding for informed investors. As the cutoff, 𝑐𝑃𝐷, is invariant to the number
of informed investors, it is the same as 𝑐𝑃𝐷 in the competitive equilibrium case. Since no
investors will behave as anything other than an informed investor, the manager need not
consider other investor types.
Interestingly, this shows that the manager’s competitive equilibrium strategy and rational
expectations equilibrium strategy are compatible. This result allows the manager to obtain
16
a maximum stock price in both the first and latter periods. Furthermore, this result implies
that the manager can achieve a higher stock price in the short run without harming the
stock price in the long run. Thus, there is no direct agency issue in terms of harming firm
value, but there is a potential expropriation of wealth if the manager has incentives based
on the period 1 (competitive equilibrium) stock price rather than the long-run (rational
expectations equilibrium) stock price.
1.5 Model characteristics
This section further examines the model through a numerical example and by looking at
implications of the statics of the model via simulation. This section also provides supple-
mental analysis for some of the proofs in the preceding section.
1.5.1 Numerical example
Parameter values for the numerical example are detailed in Table 1.1. Values for the
numerical example are chosen to be representative of an easy to illustrate case – the numbers
follow Theorem 1, and the numbers lead to slopes that are neither extremely close to 0
nor extremely large around the cutoff points. The behavior of slopes at cutoff points is
particularly important in being able to see how the equilibrium is determined, though the
equilibrium holds equally well without it.
The method to obtain the manager’s optimal action is illustrated in two steps in Figure
1.2. Panel A shows the first part of the manager’s optimization problem: Given that investors
know that the manager has an incentive to withhold information and that the manager has
the option to use a second channel which unsophisticated investors cannot quickly process,
what information should the manager disclose through the easy channel? In Panel A, the
crossing of the full disclosure and partial disclosure lines indicates the value of the signal at
which the manager is indifferent between partial and full disclosure. In this example, that
cutoff is at 0.8825 – between the mean value of the good and bad firm. Once this cutoff is
determined, the cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding can be determined, which
is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1.2. In Panel B, the intersection of the two lines again
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indicates the point at which the manager would be indifferent between partial disclosure and
withholding. This occurs at 0.3678. Note that while the graphs appear to converge on the
left side, they are not quite equal – withholding leads to a higher price for all cutoffs less
than the optimal cutoff, though the two lines limit to the same value.
In this numerical example, if the manager only had one channel available, a cutoff of
0.7535 would be optimal. Consistent with Corollary 2.1, the inclusion of a second channel
leads to a decrease in the information available through the easy channel. Likewise, the
inclusion of a second channel leads the manager to release more information to the market
overall.
Figure 1.3 depicts how these disclosure choices impact the firm’s stock price. In Panel A,
the stock price under each of the three disclosure strategies (along with the no information
case) are presented for each level of the signal 𝑦. The points of indifference discussed above,
𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷, are included as solid vertical lines. As the price determined by withholding is
formed purely based on expectations derived from the endogenously determined cutoffs, the
price is constant with respect to the value of the signal. On the far left, this constant value
dominates the price that would be obtained through any type of disclosure. For middle
values of the signal, the price from partial and full disclosure increases at a rapid rate.
As the uninformed investors’ risk-adjusted expectation of firm value is higher than that of
the informed investors, partial disclosure leads to a higher overall price in this region. On
the right portion of the graph, the price from full disclosure dominates, as the signal is
sufficiently high enough to raise the uninformed investor’s risk-adjusted expected value of
the firm compared to the no disclosure case for them. In particular, when no disclosure is
visible to the uninformed investors, they endogenously determine a 38.5% chance that the
firm is good. Likewise, the rightmost cutoff occurs when full disclosure leads to a 38.5%
probability that the firm is good.
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1.5.2 Simulation
In order to understand how changes in the model parameters affect stock price and
disclosure behavior in the model, 10,000 iterations of the model were run. Distributions for
model parameters were chosen such that they always satisfy Theorem 1; the distributions
are presented in Table 1.1. Parameters were chosen to represent a wide variety of values
and for tractability. The probability of the manager acquiring the signal is allowed to vary
from 0 to 1, encompassing all possible values. The number of investors, 𝑁 , is fixed at 100
for simplicity in applying a distribution to the number of shares available, ?¯?, as the ratio
of these quantities drives the effect of ?¯?. ?¯? is allowed to vary between 50 and 100 shares,
at integer values only. The number of uninformed investors is allowed to vary across the
entire range from 1 to 𝑁 − 1, guaranteeing that there is at least one of each investor type.
The coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑎, is allowed to vary between 0 and 1, as that level covers
a large amount of empirically identified risk aversion levels (see Table 1 of Babcock, Choi
& Feinerman (1993)). The percentage chance that the firm is good is chosen to be between
0 and 0.5 for tractability in the simulation. The probability that the firm is good heavily
influences the slope of the stock price, 𝑃0, with respect to the signal 𝑦, making the slopes at
the indifference points between disclosure choices more similar as 𝑝𝐺 increases. As such, the
numerical solver employed converges at a much faster rate when 𝑝𝐺 < 0.50. The standard
deviation, 𝜎 is bounded between 0.5 and 1, while 𝜇𝐺 is bounded between 1 and 3, and 𝜇𝐵
is set to 0. These choices assure that the condition of Theorem 1 is fulfilled and allow 𝜇𝐺 to
vary between 1 and 6 standard deviations above 𝜇𝐵.
1.5.3 Proof verification
One unique utility maximizing solution is found for the manager in each of the 10,000 it-
erations of the simulation. This provides evidence that the equilibrium described in Theorem
2 is unique. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that of the 10,000 iterations, the unconditional
expected stock price was higher in the two channel model than in the one channel model over
95% of the time, exactly 9,564 times. Furthermore, the unconditional expected firm price
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was 0.0019 higher, on average, in the two channel case. Regarding the amount of information
disclosed, the two channel case led to less disclosure in the easy channel in all iterations,
though more information was disclosed overall in all iterations. Again, this is consistent with
Corollary 2.1.
Furthermore, across all 9,913 iterations where equation (1.3) of Theorem 4 holds, 𝑃0 is
monotonic in both the full and partial disclosure states. In fact, 𝑃0 is monotonic over all
10,000 iterations in the partial disclosure state, whereas 𝑃0 in the full disclosure state shows
some lack of monotonicity when the condition is not met (62 of 87 are not monotonic). Thus,
the condition appears sufficient, though not necessary.
1.5.4 Statics
In order to understand how the unconditional stock price and disclosure pattern change
with respect to the various parameters of the model, the simulation is necessary. In par-
ticular, maximizing over the disclosure options leads to a maximization problem in which
the main determinant, 𝑦 is contained in both the PDF and CDF of the normal distribution,
leading to a seemingly intractable maximization problem. Through simulation, this issue
can be addressed by varying the underlying parameters.
Figure 1.4 illustrates how the unconditional expected stock price varies with each of 7
parameters. As expected, increasing the mean of the distribution of good firm value increases
the expected price, since that directly increases the investors expectation of firm value.
Likewise, increasing the standard deviation leads to a decrease in stock price, as the investors
are risk averse. Surprisingly, as the probability that the firm is good increases, the expected
firm price decreases. Increasing the probability the firm is good has two main effects. First,
the firm is more likely to be good, and thus the expected value of the firm will be higher.
Second, increasing 𝑝𝐺 will, over certain ranges, lead to an increase in the perceived volatility
of the firm. On average, it appears that the volatility effects overwhelm the mean effects
(for 𝑝𝐺 < 0.5). Similarly, increasing the probability that the manager receives the signal
decreases the expected firm price, due to a worse perception of non-disclosure. Increasing
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the number of uninformed investors leads to a small positive effect, driven by the larger
information asymmetry between uninformed investors and the manager when compared to
informed investors and the manager. Unsurprisingly, increasing the number of shares has
a slight negative effect on the firm price, as the number of shares only enters into the firm
pricing in a negative manner (see Proposition 2). Lastly, firm price decreases as the level of
risk aversion among the investors rises, since investors will need to be compensated more for
the risk they take on by investing.
Regarding the effects of the model parameters on the manager’s disclosure choices, Figure
1.5 illustrates the effects on the cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure, while
Figure 1.6 illustrates the effects on the cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding.
Increasing the mean value of the good firm leads to higher levels for both cutoffs.6 This is
due to the wider spread between the good and bad firms. Increasing the standard deviation
has the opposite effect, leading the manager to disclose more fully and to lower the cutoff
between partial disclosure and withholding. While the remaining factors do not exhibit a
clear pattern for the lower cutoff, the probability that the manager receives a signal does
appear to affect the cutoff between full and partial disclosure. As the probability the manager
receives a signal increases, the manager appears to disclose more through the easy channel.
The manager has an incentive to do this, as disclosing more makes uninformed investors
believe that a lack of disclosure will be more likely caused by the manager not receiving the
signal. The cutoff between partial and full disclosure is unaffected, as the informed investors
will know whether or not the manager received a signal, regardless of the probability.
1.6 Empirical implications and conclusion
The primary model of this paper demonstrates the manager’s disclosure incentives when
the manager has two voluntary disclosure channels in the presence of both uninformed and
informed investors. The model follows a market for lemons structure in which the firm may
be good or bad, and the manager probabilistically receives a signal that is potentially useful
6This pattern holds when examining the pattern between the cutoffs and a z-score, 𝜇𝐺/𝜎.
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in determining the firm’s type. If the manager receives a signal, the manager can choose
to disclose through an easy-to-process channel, a hard-to-process channel, or no channel.
When there is sufficient difference between the firm types, and when both informed and
uninformed investors are present, the manager will adopt a three part disclosure strategy.
For high values of the signal, the manager will disclose the signal through the easy-to-process
channel. For low values of the signal, the manager will choose to not disclose, withholding
the information from the market. If the value of the signal is in the middle, the manager
will disclose through the hard-to-process channel.
This disclosure pattern is also consistent with maximizing the long-run stock price of the
firm. The derived rational expectations equilibrium shows that the manager’s optimal actions
are identical when maximizing the short-run and long-run stock prices. Furthermore, when
the manager has two disclosure channels available, the stock price will be higher immediately
after any optimal manager action excluding full disclosure than after the price has settled
after multiple periods. Taken together, this indicates that, given any short run incentive to
increase the stock price, the manager in this setting can costlessly capture a gain through
the use of multiple disclosure channels.
The model further demonstrates that the manager will decrease disclosure to uninformed
investors when given the option of disclosing via a secondary channel, though the manager
will disclose more to the market overall. This could indicate a possible short-run inefficiency
in the market as the uninformed investors learn the information disclosed through the sec-
ondary voluntary channel. From the simulation, it appears that this short run effect could
be priced, and would be driven by uninformed investors valuing the firm at a higher price
than they would if they had processed all available information. However, the model also
indicates that multiple channels of disclosure may serve to make the market more efficient
over longer periods of time, as the market should fully impound more information than under
a one disclosure channel system. As managers have the option to disclose through multiple
sources, it is an open empirical issue 1) if and how managers use these channels in different
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ways and 2) if disclosing differently across channels leads to an impact on the market.
1.7 Proofs
1.7.1 Existence
Proof. To establish existence of an non-degenerate equilibrium, there must exist some point
𝑦1 such that 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 for all 𝑦 > 𝑦1, and some point 𝑦2 such that
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 for all 𝑦 < 𝑦2. These conditions can be approached through
a limit argument.
First, let 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 → ∞. Then 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 → 1, as, for all 𝛿 > 0,
lim𝑥→∞
𝜑(𝑥)
𝜑(𝑥)+𝜑(𝑥−𝛿) = 1. Furthermore, 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 , 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷, and 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 will all approach 𝑝𝐺, the un-
conditional probability that the firm is good, as, for all 𝛿 finite, lim𝑥→∞
Φ(𝑥)
Φ(𝑥)+Φ(𝑥−𝛿) = 1. Let
𝑝′ = 2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1. Substituting these probabilities into the time 0 price expressions derived
in Section 1.7.2 yields:
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 as 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 →∞,
⇒ 1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
>
𝑁𝐼𝜇𝐺 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1
]︁ ,
⇒ 𝜇𝐺
(︃
1− 𝑁𝐼 +
𝑝𝐺𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
)︃
>
𝑁𝑈
(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
+ 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
(︃
1
𝑁
− 1
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
)︃
,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
𝜇𝐻 >
𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
𝜇𝐿 + 𝑎?¯?𝜎
2 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝′)
𝑁(𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈)
,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
(𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿) > 𝑎?¯?𝜎22𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁(𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈)
,
⇒ 𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 as 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 →∞,
⇒ 1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
>
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1
]︁ ,
23
⇒ 𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
> 𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎𝑝′𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
,
⇒ (1− 𝑝𝐺)(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵) > 𝑎𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐺(1− 𝑝𝐺)),
⇒ 𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
Both conditions are identical, requiring that the difference between the mean of the
distribution for 𝑃1 for the good firm and bad firm be above a threshold of 2𝑝𝐺𝑎
?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
Next, 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 → −∞. Under this limit, 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 → 0, and
𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 → 𝑝𝐺. Let 𝑝′ = 2𝑝𝐺2 − 2𝑝𝐺 + 1. Substituting these probabilities into the time
0 price expressions derived in Section 1.7.2 yields:
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 =
1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
,
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐻𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐻)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ ,
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝑊 =
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐻𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐻)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ .
Note that the limits for 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝑊 are the same. Thus, if, in the limit, 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃𝑃𝐷,
then 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 .
1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
<
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐻𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐻)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ ,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎?¯?
(︂
𝑁𝐼
𝑁
+
𝑁𝑈
𝑁𝑝′
)︂
<
𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐺 +
𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎?¯?,
⇒ − 𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺
𝑝′𝜎2
(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵) < 𝑎?¯? 𝑁𝑈
𝑁𝑝′
(1− 𝑝′).
Since 𝜇𝐺 > 𝜇𝐵 by definition and since 𝑝
′ ∈ (0.5, 1), the statement holds for all parameter
values.
Taking the two sets of limits together, so long as 𝜇𝐺− 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2, a non-degenerate
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solution exists.
1.7.2 Derivation
This section derives 𝑃0 under each of the four states: full disclosure, partial disclosure,
withholding, and no information.
First, the probabilities in Lemma 1 must be derived. Per Bayes’ theorem, P (𝐴|𝐵) =
P(𝐴)P(𝐵|𝐴)
P(𝐵) , and P (𝐵) = P (𝐴)P (𝐵|𝐴) + P
(︀
𝐴{
)︀
P
(︀
𝐵|𝐴{)︀.
Furthermore, note that under full disclosure, both investor types know 𝑦. Under par-
tial disclosure, the informed investors will likewise know 𝑦. Under withholding, informed
investors know that 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷, where 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is an endogenously determined cutoff. Under no
information, informed investors are aware that the manager did not receive a signal, and
thus have no information to condition on. For uninformed investors, if the state is not full
disclosure, they cannot determine the state. As such, they must endogenously determine
probabilities based on a cutoff 𝑐𝐹𝐷 below which full disclosure will not occur. Thus, for
investor 𝑖 and state 𝑠, the conditional probability that the firm is good conditioned on the
given information can be defined as 𝑝𝑖,𝑠. Let 𝛽𝑥,𝑇 =
𝑥−𝜇𝑇
𝜎
, 𝜑(𝑥) be the normal distribution
PDF, and Φ(𝑥) be the normal distribution CDF.
1. It is easy to see that 𝑝𝐼,𝑁𝐼 = 𝑝𝐺, as this is the unconditional probability that the firm
is good.
2. P (𝑦 < 𝑐|𝑇 ) = Φ (︀ 𝑐−𝜇𝑇
𝜎
)︀
= Φ (𝛽𝑐,𝑇 ). Thus, 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 =
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐵)
.
3. Likewise, P (𝑦 < 𝑐 or @𝑦|𝑇 ) = 𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1 − 𝑝). Thus, 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑃 =
𝑝𝐺(𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝))
𝑝(𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐵))+(1−𝑝)
.
4. When a specific 𝑦 is known, applying Bayes’ theorem is trickier, as direct application
would lead to using P (𝑦 = 𝑐|𝑇 ) = 0. However, this is simply a case of working in a
continuous case. In the discrete case, it is intuitive to see that the problem would result
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in a ratio of PDFs of the underlying distribution. This is the same for the continuous
case. Thus, 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 =
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐵) .
Thus, the derivation of Lemma 1 is complete. Next, using equation (1.2) the price can be
derived under a general state. From (1.2),
𝑥𝑖,𝑠 =
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
−𝑅𝑓𝑃0
𝑎V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁ .
Aggregating 𝑥𝑖,𝑠 up to ?¯?:
?¯? = 𝑁𝐼𝑥𝐼,𝑠 + 𝑁𝑈𝑥𝑈,𝑠.
Solving the above for 𝑃0,𝑠 yields:
𝑃0,𝑠 =
𝑁𝐼
E[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
+ 𝑁𝑈
E[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
− 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
[︂
𝑁𝐼
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
+ 𝑁𝑈
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
]︂ .
Next, this expression can be explicitly provided for each of the four states. Note that
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
= 𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑖,𝑠)𝜇𝐵 and V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
= 𝑝𝑖,𝑠
2𝜎2+(1−𝑝𝑖,𝑠)2𝜎2 = (2𝑝𝑖,𝑠2−2𝑝𝑖,𝑠+1)𝜎2.
Thus, the price at time 0 can explicitly be written, under each of the four states, as:
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 =
1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷
2 − 2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 + 1)𝜎2
]︁
,
𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷2−2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷2−2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ ,
𝑃0,𝑊 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐼,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑊+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐼,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑊+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ ,
𝑃0,𝑁𝐼 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ .
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1.7.3 Disclosure patterns
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, as the two disclosure cutoffs and 𝑦 approach infinity,
full disclosure will have a higher price than partial disclosure and withholding when the
existence condition is met. Thus, full disclosure will be used for at least all 𝑦 above some
point 𝑦. Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 1, as the two disclosure cutoffs and 𝑦
approach negative infinity, full disclosure will have a lower price than partial disclosure and
withholding. Thus, full disclosure will not be the only strategy employed.
Furthermore, note that 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 is a monotonic function of the signal 𝑦, and ranges from
0 to 1. Likewise, 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 is a monotonic function of the cutoff between partial disclosure and
withholding, but ranges from 0 to 𝑝𝐺. Thus, when the cutoff is at 𝑦, these two lines will cross
for some value 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷. Also note that 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷, while not monotonic in the cutoff between full
disclosure and partial disclosure, is bounded above at 𝑝𝐺 and is bounded below by the value
of 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷, as 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 represents a transformation of 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁
𝐷
to 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑁,𝐷) =
𝑎𝑁+1−𝑎
𝑎𝐷+1−𝑎 ,
where 𝑎,𝐷,𝑁 ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for some 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑐𝐹𝐷 > 𝑐𝑃𝐷.
Now, consider a specific case in which 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷. Let 𝑦 be a signal such that
𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷. In this case, the inferred distributions by uninformed investors will be the
same regardless of the manager’s disclosure choice. This case occurs when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷 as
discussed above, and thus exists.
Next, consider a specific case in which 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃0,𝑊 . Let 𝑦 be the signal such that
𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 . In this case, the inferred distributions by informed investors will be the same
regardless of the manager’s disclosure choice. This case occurs when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷 as discussed
above, and thus also exists. Furthermore, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is strictly less than 𝑐𝐹𝐷, and thus there exists
a bounded region on which the manager will prefer partial disclosure. Furthermore, below
the boundary of the region, the manager will prefer withholding.
Thus, all three disclosure options will be used in the manager’s optimal disclosure strat-
egy: withholding for low values of 𝑦, partial disclosure for middle values, and full disclosure
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for high values.7
7Note that while this proof shows that the manager will have 2 cutoff points, it does not preclude the
manager from having cutoff points other than the 2 mentioned. Thus, it does not fully constitute a proof of
uniqueness. Such a proof would need to show that no cutoff point can exist when the probability that the
firm is good from the investors’ perspective changes based on the manager’s disclosure choice.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Diagram of the full model
Firm
Manager
Easy Channel Hard Channel
Uninformed
Investors
Informed Investors
A diagram of the flow of information in the market. Solid lines represent information transfers, dashed lines represent partial information
transfers, and dotted lines represent information transfers that only occur in the long run.
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Figure 1.2: Optimizing disclosure
Panel A: Full disclosure vs partial disclosure
Panel B: Partial disclosure vs withholding
These two graphs illustrate the process for choosing the optimal disclosure cutoff points from the
manager’s perspective. The graphs are based on the numerical example parameters listed in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.3: Optimal disclosure
Panel A: Stock price as a function of disclosure choice
Panel B: Pricing as a function of the signal, 𝑦
These graphs show the stock price at time 0, 𝑃0, as a function of the signal the manager receives (if
received) and the manager’s disclosure choice. Panel A shows the payoffs for all disclosure choices, whereas
Panel B shows the price as a function of the manager’s optimal choices. These graphs are based on the
numerical example parameters listed in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.4: Pricing statics
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.983, 𝑝 < 0.001 −1.282, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.627, 𝑝 < 0.001
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
−0.086, 𝑝 < 0.001 0.0008, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.003, 𝑝 < 0.001
Risk aversion, 𝑎
−0.331, 𝑝 < 0.001
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between firm price at time 0 (𝑃0) on the
vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal axes. These plots are based on a
simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1.1 for specific details). Lighter colors represent a
greater concentration of values near the specific parameter-price pairing, and the enclosed regions represent
level curves of the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends based on OLS regressions are noted above the
graphs; graphs with no significant trends are instead marked as such.
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Figure 1.5: Disclosure statics, cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.522, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.213, 𝑝 < 0.001 Not significant
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
−0.317, 𝑝 < 0.001 Not significant Not significant
Risk aversion, 𝑎
Not significant
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between the disclosure cutoff between full
disclosure and partial disclosure on the vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal
axes. These plots are based on a simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1.1 for specific
details). Lighter colors represent a greater concentration of values near the specific parameter-disclosure
cutoff, and the enclosed regions represent level curves of the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends
based on OLS regressions are noted above the graphs; graphs with no significant trends are instead marked
as such.
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Figure 1.6: Disclosure statics, cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.474, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.589, 𝑝 < 0.001 Not significant
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
Not significant Not significant Not significant
Risk aversion, 𝑎
Not significant
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between the disclosure cutoff between partial
disclosure and withholding on the vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal axes.
These plots are based on a simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1.1 for specific details).
Lighter colors represent a greater concentration of values near the specific parameter-disclosure cutoff, and
the enclosed regions represent level curves of the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends based on OLS
regressions are noted above the graphs; graphs with no significant trends are instead marked as such.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Numerical example and simulation parameters
Parameter Example value Simulation distribution
𝜇𝐺 2 Uniform[1, 3]
𝜇𝐵 0 0
𝜎 1 Uniform[0.5, 1]
𝑝𝐺 0.5 Uniform[0, 0.5]
𝑝 0.5 Uniform[0, 1]
𝑅𝑓 1 1
𝑁 100 100
𝑁𝑈 50 ⌊Uniform[1, 100]⌋
𝑁𝐼 50 𝑁 −𝑁𝑈
?¯? 100 ⌊Uniform[50, 101]⌋
𝑎 1 Uniform[0, 1]
This table shows the distributions for each parameter in the simulation. The parameter choices are
chosen such that 2𝑝𝐺𝜎
2 ?¯?
𝑁 < 1 and 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 1, thus fulfilling the requirements of Corollary 1.
35
2 Market Reaction to Shifting of
Voluntary Disclosures Across
Disclosure Channels
2.1 Introduction
Managers are gatekeepers of information about their firms. Consequently, managerial
incentives can shape how information is voluntarily disclosed by a firm. This paper explores
a new way in which managers can shift voluntary disclosures: by choosing between two dis-
closure channels based on the perceived ease or difficulty for users to process the information.
I build a scenario around two disclosure channels taking on two opposing levels of ease of
processing: easy or difficult to process. The basic premise is that managers more frequently
choose the easy to process channel to communicate positive information and the difficult to
process channel to communicate negative information. I operationalize this design by using
the voluntary portion of SEC filings as the difficult to process channel and select portions
of firm websites (excluding advertising, commerce pages, support pages, etc.) as the easy
to process channel. I propose that these two channels represent very different disclosure op-
tions, as websites should be both easier to access and easier to interpret (an “easy channel”),
and thus should have a lower cost to process. SEC filings, on the other hand, require some
specific knowledge and training to process efficiently (a “hard channel”), and thus should
have a higher cost to process. Because information in different channels could represent dif-
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ferent costs to investors, managers can use this difference to their advantage to increase stock
prices by releasing more good news through an easy channel and more bad news through a
hard channel.
Specifically, this study focuses on two issues: 1) how managers’ use of multiple disclosure
channels affects firms’ stock prices, and 2) if managers make strategic use of higher stock
prices induced by their disclosure channel choices. To address these questions, I examine the
text of voluntary disclosures of over 2,500 SEC filings and contemporaneous monthly web-
site updates from 196 randomly selected, publicly traded, U.S. firms from November 2000
through December 2014. A custom algorithm paired with a series of simulations is used
to distinguish between the voluntary and mandatory portions of SEC filing text, removing
language that is similar to prior years as well as to other contemporaneous filings. The vol-
untary disclosure text in the SEC filings is then structured into machine-learned disclosure
topics, using the Joint Sentiment-Topic analysis algorithm of Lin & He (2009). This algo-
rithm likewise identifies whether a topic has positive, negative, or neutral sentiment. This
resulting structure is used to determine two quantities of interest: the extent to which dis-
closures made through firm websites versus SEC filings are more positive (henceforth tone
difference) and the extent to which the disclosures discussed across the two channels are
different (henceforth disclosure distance).
Findings indicate that managers appear to strategically use multiple disclosure channels
in order to increase stock prices in the short run by voluntarily disclosing information with
much more positive (negative) language through firm websites (SEC filings). This strategy
leads to a short run price increase most strongly when firms disclose similar information
across the two channels and when firms have decreasing earnings. I further document that
managers appear to have financial incentives to strategically use the disclosure channels, as
a positive (negative) relation between both stock ownership and exercisable options and tone
difference (disclosure distance) is documented. Managers’ trading behavior is also associated
with their disclosure strategies, with at least some managers capitalizing on the temporarily
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higher stock price induced by strategic disclosure. In additional tests, I find that firms’ stock
prices are more strongly impacted by managers’ disclosure choices if the firms’ stocks are
less liquid.
This study provides three main contributions to the literature. First, I introduce a new
textual analysis-based measure to examine two different disclosure channels. Using text
analysis allows for calculating large-scale measures in an efficient manner which would be
infeasible to calculate by hand, and allows researchers to capture a more comprehensive
measure of voluntary disclosure (Core, 2001; Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010). I use
the Joint Sentiment-Topic Analysis (JST) algorithm of Lin & He (2009) to simultaneously
identify disclosures and sentiment within each disclosure channel across time and across
firms. By comparing the amount of positive and negative voluntary disclosure through each
disclosure topic in firms’ SEC Filings and websites, I derive a context-specific measure of
the tone difference of disclosures across channels. Furthermore, the distribution of voluntary
disclosure topics across SEC filings and firm websites is examined. These two measures
provide a more holistic view of the disclosures as compared to word-count or tone measures.
Second, the strategy examined in this study differs from these prior studies such as
Aboody & Kasznik (2000) and Kothari, Shu & Wysocki (2009) in two important ways: first,
the strategy examined in this paper relates to contemporaneous disclosure across two channels
rather than disclosures at two different points in time, and second, the strategy in this
paper relates to a joint decision of what to disclose across two channels rather than a single
channel. In particular, managers appear to voluntarily disclose more negative information
through SEC filings and more positive information through their firms’ websites. This result
is differentiated from the choice of venue for disclosing management earnings forecasts in
Bamber & Cheon (1998) in two ways. I use two publicly available disclosure channels,
websites and SEC filings, which eliminates concern about litigation. In addition, these two
channels are likely to be comprehensive, due to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). While
managers have greater constraints on private disclosure, managers can still strategically
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choose the distribution of voluntary disclosures between their firms’ websites and SEC filings.
Likewise, this result differs from Davis & Tama-Sweet (2012), as the shifting is related to
the overall tone of the disclosures rather than the prevalence of negative tone. Furthermore,
this paper links the disclosure behavior to incentives from management compensation, and
documents a relationship between disclosure strategy and CEO trading behavior.
Third, this paper benefits by the vast and rich information available on the firms’ own
website, allowing for the examination and analysis of a large set of website data. While the
internet was expected to pass 3 billion users in 2015 (International Telecommunication Union,
2015), prior accounting studies have rarely examined disclosure content of firm websites.
This study provides an initial attempt at categorizing voluntary disclosures contained on
firm websites in an automated and scalable manner.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section will discuss prior
literature, theory, and hypotheses. Section 2.3 discusses data and methodology, while Section
2.4 presents the main findings. Section 2.5 then presents robustness checks and discusses
endogeneity. I provide a summary and conclusions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Prior literature and theory
2.2.1 Prior literature
The timing and content of voluntary disclosure has attracted interest among accounting
researchers because of the effects these factors have on the behavior of users and market
participants. The extant literature has focused on three primary questions: Why do firms
voluntarily disclose?, What is the accuracy of disclosure?, and What is the effect of such
disclosure? In this paper I focus primarily on the third question, that is, I examine the effect
of managers voluntarily disclosing information through different channels simultaneously. In
order for this question to be meaningful, it is necessary that managers have some control
over the disclosure processes. In a related study, Yang (2012) examines the accuracy of indi-
vidual managers’ forecasts and the resulting impact on their firms’ stock prices. The results
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show that managers with a history of higher degrees of accuracy observe stronger market
responses. Thus, managers’ disclosure choices seem to be valued by market participants, and
consequently managers’ choices of where to disclose information may affect market response
to the information.
Furthermore, managers must have an incentive to be strategic in their disclosure pat-
terns. One potential incentive is to increase stock prices. In particular, managers often own
company stock or have stock option based compensation, both of which are intended to align
their incentives with shareholders. However, if managers intend to liquidate some of their
equity holdings or exercise some of their stock options, they could attempt to choose the
types and channels of disclosure that would lead to a stock price increase. Conversely, if a
manager is to receive stock options in the near future, the manager will have an incentive to
manage stock prices downward (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000). Furthermore, Kothari, Lewellen
& Warner (2006) and Kothari et al. (2009) demonstrate that good news is released in a
consistent fashion, while bad news is back-loaded. By releasing good news earlier than bad
news, managers can attempt to increase their stock price in the short run, that is, until the
bad news is released. Thus, managers appear to make strategic choices about the timing of
disclosures.
From a market-efficiency perspective, there are two ways that managers could induce an
upward shift in stock prices. First, they can shift the timing of disclosure (such as withholding
bad news and releasing good news), consistent with Kothari et al. (2006) and Kothari et al.
(2009). Second, managers could provide both good and bad news to the market, but they
could make bad news more difficult to process. That is, bad news could be made more
difficult to acquire or made to require more cognitive effort to understand. For example, bad
news can be made more difficult to acquire by burying the bad news among other already
known information or through altering the readability of the disclosures, as was found to be
the case in the MD&A section of a 10-K filings examined in Li (2008). However, as different
disclosure channels have different traits (readability, convenience, or ease of access), shifting
40
disclosures across channels can affect when the disclosures will be reflected in firms’ stock
prices. In terms of the Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (Bloomfield, 2002), information
processing costs can lead to information being impounded into the stock price more slowly.
Thus, information that is easier to process should be reflected in the stock price more quickly
than information that is more difficult to process. If good news is released in a manner that
is easier to process than bad news, this could lead to a short run increase in the stock price,
i.e., until the bad news is fully impounded.
Lastly, this paper is related to the accounting literature on internet based accounting
disclosure. As website data is largely unstructured, prior literature on website disclosures
(often termed Internet Financial Reporting or IFR) has relied largely on indexes and hand
collection of small samples (see Table 1 of Abdelsalam, Bryant & Street (2007) for an overview
of early studies examining website disclosures). Likewise, as website data is difficult to obtain
in a time series, many studies opted for examining the data at a point in time rather than
as a panel. Debreceny, Gray & Rahman (2002) uses one of the largest samples in early
studies, covering one point in time for 660 firms across 22 countries, looking at the format of
firm websites (none, static, or dynamic) and the amount of financial content disclosed (none,
summary, full, or additional). Their study finds a link between firm size, high tech industries,
and US listing as determinants of website disclosures. In more recent studies, Kelton &
Yang (2008) uses 36 index elements covering content and format for 284 firms in 2004 to
examine the relationship between corporate governance and website disclosure transparency.
Bagnoli, Wang & Watts (2014) examines the presence of nine specific disclosures on 894 US
and Taiwanese firm websites in 2008 and 2009, and links the disclosures to analyst coverage,
institutional ownership, and earnings response in stock prices.
2.2.2 Theory
This paper examines potential effects of managers selectively conveying information
through different disclosure channels. Before Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) came
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into effect on October 23, 20001, Bamber & Cheon (1998) shows that managers do appear
to strategically pick where they disclose earnings information. However, in this pre-Reg FD
setting, managers were, at times, choosing to release information in venues that were not
publicly visible. This result consequently relies on managers being able to privately disclose
information, an action that became restricted once Reg FD came into effect. Consequently,
managers likely changed their strategies after Regulation FD. In this paper, I examine one
strategic choice for disseminating information. In particular, I consider the interaction of
three factors: ease of processing (easy or hard), disclosure sentiment, and disclosure con-
tent. Ease of processing is considered from the perspective of the disclosure channel of the
information, and two channels are examined. To proxy for easier to process information, vol-
untary disclosures through firm websites are examined, and to proxy for harder to process
disclosures, voluntary disclosures through SEC filings are examined. Disclosure sentiment is
analyzed as the relative sentiment between the two channels, referred to as tone difference.
Lastly, the similarity of content across the two channels is considered, termed disclosure
distance.
This study is based on the premise that the information released via a company’s web-
site should have lower processing costs than the information released via SEC filings. In
terms of acquisition costs, firm websites are easily accessible and should be easier for un-
sophisticated investors to acquire. Regarding the costs of extracting information, websites
can be interactive and have more structured navigation, which can potentially decrease the
cost of extracting information (Grant, 2015)2. Furthermore, firm websites are more likely
to be written in plain English when compared to SEC filings. SEC filings, on the other
1“Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,” http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.
htm.
2In particular, Grant (2015) finds that interactivity increases investors’ acquisition of information when
viewed on a standard computer screen, but decreases information acquisition on small screens. As the
majority of investors trade on standard computer screens (only 15 to 20% of trades occurred on mobile
devices as of March 2014, Carey (2014)), interactivity should increase information acquisition overall.
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hand, require some specific knowledge or training to process efficiently. If managers have
an incentive to increase their firms’ stock prices in the short run, managers are likely to
release relatively less bad news through their websites than through SEC filings. It may
be possible that managers may also influence the information generation process, trying to
produce more positive information so as to enable disclosure of more good news on their
firms’ websites. However, there are natural constraints on how far managers can take this
(at least without committing fraud), as the activities of the firm should provide a basis for
the information generated. In either case, the predicted result is the same: managers would
be expected to release more positive information relative to negative information through
their firms’ websites than through their firms’ SEC filings. While there may be little tension
to this, this result has not yet been documented in the accounting literature. As such, this
is formalized as a hypothesis presented in the alternative form:
Hypothesis 1: Managers select a higher ratio of positive information to
negative information for voluntary disclosure through their firms’ websites
compared to their SEC Filings.
If investors find it more difficult to extract information from SEC filings than firm web-
sites, then, per the Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis of Bloomfield (2002), investors should
impound the good news more quickly than the bad news. This would consequently inflate
the stock price, albeit temporarily (Bloomfield, 2002). Even if some investors have the pro-
cessing capability to process all voluntary disclosures across firms’ websites and SEC filings,
the investors may not be able to force all information to be impounded in the stock price
immediately, so long as the there is sufficient pressure on the stock price exerted by other
investors (Tetlock, 2011). This is likewise consistent with the main finding of the analytical
model presented in Chapter 1, that shifting more good news and less bad news to an easy
channel leads to a higher stock price in the short run while not affecting the long run equilib-
rium stock price. In essence, a higher stock price due to strategic disclosure channel choices
will be temporary, as the stock price will revert over time to reflect all publicly available
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information.
However, this pricing effect will be affected by two factors: managers’ incentives to
strategically choose channels for voluntary disclosures and the relevance of the information
discussed on the website. If a firm is doing well, there is little incentive to strategically choose
disclosure channels, as there will be much more good news than bad news. If, however, a firm
is doing poorly, such as having decreased earnings, there is more incentive to strategically
choose disclosure channels. Regarding information relevance, if managers discuss similar
topics across their websites and SEC filings, participants in the marketplace are likely to
initially place more weight on the information disclosed through firm websites as compared
to a setting in which managers discuss completely different topics across the two channels.
As shown in Asay, Elliott & Rennekamp (2015), investors are more likely to seek outside
information when managers provide less readable disclosure, as they feel less comfortable
relying on the information. Similarly, if investors recognize that information is missing, they
should be less comfortable relying on the information disclosed through the firm website,
driving them to seek outside information. Alternatively, a website that contains less relevant
discussion may simply contain less information, making it harder to extract any relevant
information contained in it. In this case, the cost to extract the information would increase,
decreasing its expected impact on the stock price.
If managers’ incentives to strategically choose disclosure channels or the relevance of firms’
content websites is missing, little to no effect should be expected. Furthermore, if the market
is perfectly efficient (i.e., has no frictions), or if other sources are able to convey important
information from the filing to investors and they process this information efficiently, there
should be no effect of releasing different information through firms’ websites or SEC filings.
Likewise, if strategically disclosing across channels is too costly for managers, or if managers
have limited control over firms’ website or filing content, there should be no effect. Taken
together, this leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:
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Hypothesis 2: A) If firms voluntarily release information that is more pos-
itive (overall) through their websites than their SEC filings, the firms’ stock
prices should be higher than expected shortly after the SEC filing release
dates. This effect will be greater for firms with similar voluntary disclosures
across their websites and SEC filings and for firms with worse financial per-
formance.
B) The firms’ stock prices should see an abnormal decrease subsequently as
the more difficult to process disclosures are fully impounded. This effect will
be greater for firms with similar voluntary disclosures across their websites
and SEC filings and firms with worse financial performance.
Given the above framework, managers need to have an incentive to strategically choose
disclosure channels. Since the stock price in the long run is expected to be the same (as all
information in both channels is public), if an economic motivation exists, it must be a short
run motivation. One potential incentive is through their compensation packages. By making
strategic disclosure channel choices, managers could potentially increase the short run stock
price without incurring any long run decrease in firm value. If the manager has exercisable
options or stock, increasing the price in the short run may lead to greater expected utility
to the manager. Conversely, if the manager expects a cost from making strategic disclosure
channel choices (such as decreased credibility), the manager may choose not to make such
choices across disclosure channels even if there is a short run financial motivation to do so.
If no such motivation exists but the expected disclosure pattern is found, managers may be
exhibiting a bias that systematically leads to more positive disclosure.
Hypothesis 3: Managers with more stock and exercisable option holdings
have a greater incentive to strategically choose disclosure channels, as they
have a greater ability to capitalize on an short run increase in stock price.
The cost of trading on any information gathered is dependent on the frictions in the
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market, such as illiquidity. Likewise, the processing costs for information also depend on
factors that are less controllable by managers, such as investor composition, media coverage,
analyst coverage, and other firms’ disclosures.
2.2.2.1 Market frictions
If a firm’s stock is more liquid, information should be impounded more quickly (Chordia
& Roll, 2008; Chung & Hrazdil, 2010), as there will be lower costs to trading on information
contained in an SEC filing. On the other hand, the reduced costs also decrease the cost of
trading on potentially misleading information on a firm’s website. Under theories of noise
traders (Campbell, Grossman & Wang, 1993), higher liquidity could instead potentially
induce short run mispricing if noise traders are more likely to attend to the information
on the website (again, because website information is less difficult to process). This would
likewise be empirically consistent with Bloomfield, O’Hara & Saar (2009), which shows
that, despite providing liquidity, uninformed traders can lead to slower impounding of new
information into stock prices, and Tetlock (2011), which shows that more liquid stocks have
larger return reversals after stale news is released compared to less liquid stocks.
Given the conflicting evidence on the effect of liquidity, the following hypothesis is stated
in the null form:
Hypothesis 4: Firms with greater liquidity may or may not exhibit a lower
effect of strategic disclosure on firms’ stock prices.
2.2.2.2 Processing costs
One constraint on the effect of processing costs is the composition of the investors in the
market, as institutional investors should have lower processing costs (or more resources avail-
able to process information) than other investors. Thus, if there are more institutional in-
vestors in a firm’s investment base, any stock price increase should be shorter lived (Boehmer
& Kelley, 2009), or may not happen at all. On the other hand, if institutional ownership is
concentrated, institutional owners may or may not have an incentive to keep the stock price
in line with the information they have processed. Instead, they may have an incentive to
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induce short run market volatility to increase their own gains.
A potential mediator of the difference between voluntary disclosures released via a firm’s
website and those released via SEC filings is the media. The media’s primary incentive is
to have as many views as possible, whether the views come from newspaper circulation,
television viewership, or online views. In order to have as many views as possible, the
media must 1) make content easily understandable, and 2) provide content that will interest
potential viewers. Assuming media is easier to understand than SEC filings, if the media
identifies a voluntary disclosure provided via SEC filings which is not provided via the firm’s
website, the media can potentially increase the rate at which this voluntary disclosure is
impounded in stock prices. However, it is likely that the media does not provide information
that the market has not impounded, but instead repeats information that is likely to be the
most sensational (such as the stale information in Tetlock (2011)). In such a case, media may
repeat the best and the worst news, even if such news has already been disclosed through a
firm’s website. This would not lead to any quicker impounding of information, and, if media
is construed as new information as in Tetlock (2011), this could lead to a larger temporary
shift in a firm’s stock price. Likewise, if interpreting media articles is difficult, the cost to
investors of viewing media which contains no information beyond what is already impounded
could lead to a longer period of time during which the stock price is abnormally higher.
Another information intermediary that could potentially affect the perception of firm
disclosures is analyst coverage. Analysts may help to provide information to investors, as in
Hong, Lim & Stein (2000), where higher analyst coverage is found to limit the profitability of
momentum strategies. On the other hand, Doukas, Kim & Pantzalis (2005) finds that higher
analyst coverage may lead to overvaluation and overly high sentiment for a firm. Investor
sentiment has been previously shown to interact with manager disclosure choices surrounding
management earnings forecasts (Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008) and pro forma earnings
metrics in earnings press releases (Brown, Christensen, Elliott & Mergenthaler, 2012). If
sentiment likewise interacts with managers’ disclosure channel choices, then higher analyst
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coverage may lead to a greater effect of strategic disclosure channel choices by management.
Lastly, it is possible that competing firms’ choices of disclosure channels may mitigate
the impact of other firms’ choices of disclosure channels within industry. Similar instances
of disclosure spillover or accounting contagion have been documented in the literature, such
as a stock price impact of related firms issuing a restatement (Gleason, Jenkins & Johnson,
2008) and banks loan-loss reserve announcements (Docking, Hirschey & Jones, 1997). As
such, if firms in the same industry have had higher tone difference, on average, over a short
window leading up to a firm’s filing date, then the tone difference of the firm may have a
lower impact, as investors may have already anticipated the manager’s disclosure channel
choices.
Firms with lower processing costs due to outside factors should see a smaller stock price
effect of strategic disclosure by management. As each of these possible factors influencing
processing costs may or may not be effective, the following hypothesis is stated in the null
form:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with greater levels of institutional investors, media
coverage, analyst coverage, and strategic disclosure by competitors may or
may not exhibit a lower effect of strategic disclosure on firms’ stock prices.
2.3 Methodology
In order to determine the voluntary disclosures made by firms at a broader level, textual
data sources are used. Such sources have the benefit of encompassing much more informa-
tion than financial data, as textual information can capture both financial and nonfinancial
information, as well as historical and forward looking information. Furthermore, text-based
information is particularly well suited for the voluntary disclosure setting, as there are few
restrictions on the text compared to a mandatory disclosure setting. Textual data sources for
the project encompass a large amount of disclosures by or about firms, including information
from websites, SEC filings, and media. Also needed for the analyses are stock market, finan-
cial statement, manager compensation, insider trading, investor base, and analyst coverage
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data, which are obtained from CRSP, Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly, SEC ownership
reports derived from Form 4 filings, Compustat ExecuComp, Thomson Reuters 13F, and
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, respectively. Sufficient data to run all tests over the period
from November 2000 to December 2014 is obtained.
The study is organized as an event study around SEC filing dates of 10-K and 10-Q
filings, with filing dates pulled from the SEC EDGAR system. The voluntary portion of the
disclosures in the filings is then compared to the new information on firm websites for the
month that the filing was released.
In order to study web disclosure in a panel setting, this study makes use of a novel data
source, The Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. 500 firms from the intersection of the
Wayback Machine and Compustat were randomly selected,3 and after merging with CRSP,
removing firms with insufficient data, and removing financial firms, the sample consists of 196
publicly traded North American firms from November 2000 to December 2014, with 2,671
total website updates. In order to process this large amount of data, this study implements a
new methodology from the computer science literature, the Joint Sentiment-Topic Analysis
algorithm of Lin & He (2009) (JST).
2.3.1 Textual data
In order to capture historical firm websites, historical web pages are gathered from The
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine since 1996. The Wayback Machine represents a massive
source of rich textual data, containing 23 petabytes of data as of July 1, 2015 (The Internet
Archive, 2015). In order to identify firm website urls, Compustat is used, which provides
a url for approximately 85% of firm years since 1998.4 Across all Compustat firms with a
10-K or 10-Q filed with the SEC between 1994 and 2014, the Wayback Machine provides
3A firm’s inclusion in the Wayback Machine may or may not be random. The choice to include a website
is based on the behavior of Archive.org’s web crawlers as well as requests from users of the site.
4Data is gathered prior to Reg FD as a baseline is needed to gauge new additions to firm websites. Only
123 firm-month website observations in the final sample occur prior to Reg FD – these observations are
removed from the sample subsequently.
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an average of 27.5 firm-month website updates per firm through December 2014. In order
to limit the amount of data collection needed, 500 firms are randomly selected from the
intersection of Compustat and the Wayback Machine, under the restrictions that the firms
1) have a website URL in Compustat and 2) have at least one website update in the Wayback
Machine.
Websites are gathered in an iterative process. The first step of the process is to download
the last update to a firm’s homepage in a month. Then, all links on the page are evaluated.
Links on the firm’s website that lead to a news or investor relations page owned by the
firm that are in English are parsed the same way as the homepage. Links to other pages
owned by the firm in English that are not support pages or consumer facing (store pages,
internet radio stations, etc.), and links that are not owned by the firm but are intentionally
linked to and are in English are downloaded but not parsed any further. JavaScript and
CSS files are parsed for urls, but are not included in the final data set. This process goes
on for a maximum page depth of two. Text is parsed from any html pages, other similar
markup-based pages, Microsoft Word files, Microsoft PowerPoint files,5 and well-formed pdf
files. In order to capture only the new information on the website, only sentences and lines
that were not on the web page in the prior monthly update are included in the data.
In the end, the web data includes new content that has been added to a firm’s website that
is within one click of the firm’s corporate homepage. Furthermore, the web data excludes
SEC filings, potentially biased content such as advertisements and store pages, non-English
pages, support pages, and content that is unlikely to have been intentionally included on the
website, such as malware.
SEC filings are obtained from the SEC EDGAR FTP. All 10-K and 10-Q filings since
1994 are included in the data set, as filings are not available electronically prior to 1994. All
tests are conducted using filings that are released after October 2000. As 10-K and 10-Q
5Only for .pptx files, i.e., PowerPoint 2007 or later files. Earlier files use a proprietary format which did
not prove to be parsable.
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filings are mandatory, much of their content is likely to be mandatory disclosure rather than
voluntary disclosure. This is controlled for in two steps, discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2.
Lastly, media is proxied by a complete set of Lexis Nexis articles related to firms starting
in 2007, using Lexis Nexis’ company search function. As Wall Street Journal articles are only
included as abstracts, article text for Wall Street Journal articles is obtained from ProQuest
Historical Newspapers. ProQuest articles are matched based on article publication date and
a fuzzy match on article titles. When no article is found based on these criteria, the article
abstract from Lexis Nexis is used instead.6
2.3.2 Voluntary disclosures
In order to isolate the voluntary disclosure portions of 10-Ks and 10-Qs, I employ a
novel methodology based on Levenshtein distance. Levenshtein distance is the count of the
minimum number of deletions, insertions, and changes needed to be made to get from one set
of text to another, and thus it is a natural distance measure for comparing text (Levenshtein,
1966). In particular, normalized Levenshtein distance at the word level is used to compare
sentences across documents, with the normalized distance calculated as the minimum number
of words needed to be changed, added or remove to get from one sentence to the other, divided
by the length of the longer sentence.
Before using Levenshtein distance to parse out the voluntary portion of the filings, all
10-Ks and 10-Qs are examined to verify that they contain sufficient text. In particular, any
filings with less than 4 paragraphs of text are removed.
Next, each company’s boilerplate language is removed from its filings. This is controlled
for using a set of the four most recent 10-K or 10-Q filings. A simulation was run in order to
determine the optimal normalized Levenshtein distance to use as a cutoff: for 10-K filings a
distance of 0.574 is used, and for 10-Q filings a distance of approximately 0.558 is used (see
6Some articles, despite being a match, do not have full text available via ProQuest. Lexis Nexis abstracts
are used in place of the full text of these articles. Furthermore, license terms prevented downloading the
text of certain other articles – such articles are again included using the Lexis Nexis abstract.
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Appendix C for more details). Then, all sentences that are within the associated normalized
distance with at least one sentence of one of the company’s recent filings are removed. Doing
so removes approximately 48.6% of sentences across 10-K filings and 65.5% of sentences
across 10-Q filings.
The second step is to control for new boilerplate language introduced by new disclosure
requirements. To control for this, a set of three filings from the same filing date as the filing
of interest are obtained. These filings are chosen at random from the set of filings released
that day that are not from the same GICS sector as the firm and that are not from the
banking and finance GICS sector (40). In the event that there are less than three filings
on the same day meeting this criteria, then any filings meeting the criteria are used along
with random filings from the previous day (subject to the same restrictions). This process is
repeated until three suitable filings are found. Filings outside the firm’s industry are chosen
to avoid accidentally removing voluntary disclosures (if voluntary disclosures are correlated
within industry). In the event that all firms within an industry begin to make a particular
disclosure in the same way, this would be captured by the first step (company lags). For
the first instance of such a disclosure, however, the disclosure would not be removed, but
is controlled for in regressions later through the use of GICS sector cross year fixed effects.
Furthermore, the banking sector is removed as banking is more heavily regulated than other
industries. Again, a simulation was used to determine the optimal cutoff points: for both
10-K and 10-Q filings the cutoff is approximately 0.563 (see Appendix C for more details).
All sentences within each filing’s respective cutoff from a sentence in the contemporaneous
filings are eliminated, removing an additional 8.6% of sentences across 10-K filings and 11.9%
of text across 10-Q filings.
The resulting text is consequently new text that has not been used by the firm in the prior
four filings or by contemporaneous filings. As mandatory disclosures are often boilerplate,
the resulting text is unlikely to constitute mandatory disclosure, and instead is more likely
to be voluntary.
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For websites, the month-over-month added text is used. That is, the text of the current
month’s last update is compared with the text of the prior month (or prior observation if
there was no update during the prior month). This provides a measure of what was added
to the website – that is, what was disclosed during the month. Such a measure will be
noisy compared to the precise, daily event window of the filings. However, assuming that
any changes to the website on the day the filing is released are correlated with the overall
changes during the month, then the measure will still be relevant. Furthermore, using a
monthly window mitigates bias caused by the potentially-nonrandom update frequency for
website updates as captured by The Internet Archive. As updates are captured using a
crawling mechanism and as requested by users, the frequency of requests could potentially
induce bias into a changes design in early years when daily updates were not available. The
impact of the monthly window is controlled for in a robustness check as well.
2.3.3 Measures of differences in voluntary disclosure
In order to determine the voluntary disclosures made by firms at a broader level, the
Joint Sentiment-Topic Analysis (JST) algorithm of Lin & He (2009) is employed.7 This
methodology has a distinct benefit of not focusing on any single type of disclosure, as it
captures a broad set of disclosures in an unsupervised fashion. This is particularly important
for the question at hand, as it would be difficult to observe managers shifting a single
disclosure to one channel or another, limiting the power of any statistical analysis. Instead,
JST captures a broad set of potential disclosures, each of which is algorithmically determined
from the firms’ voluntary disclosures via SEC filings.
While the above is also true of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), JST provides additional
useful information about the disclosures. In particular, JST provides a context-specific as-
sessment of the sentiment of the disclosure topics. Consequently, this provides an assessment
7JST is based on a methodology called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an algorithm by Blei, Ng
& Jordan (2003). LDA has been used by at least two other papers in the accounting literature, including
Brown, Crowley & Elliott (2015) and Hoberg & Lewis (2015).
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of the underlying tone of the disclosures (henceforth disclosure tone) that should account
for any potential intricacies of the voluntary disclosure environment. The algorithm does
so by determining the likelihood that each word is positive, negative, or neutral in the con-
text of the topic. The algorithm is weakly supervised in this dimension, using the MPQA
subjectivity lexicon8 as a prior.
The goal of the algorithm is to identify two specific sets of information. First, the al-
gorithm is used to identify, broadly, the voluntary disclosures made via SEC filings. The
categories of disclosures, as determined by the JST algorithm, will comprise the disclosure
topics. The algorithm is only capable of determining disclosure topics when told how many
topics to find – thus, the number of topics is a model parameter which is simulated. Second,
the algorithm is used to identify measures of disclosure-specific sentiment. The sentiment
measures flow directly from the disclosure topics identified by the JST algorithm, the struc-
ture of the documents, and the sentiment prior (the MPQA subjectivity lexicon).
In order to calculate the measure, a few other operations are necessary (for computational
feasibility). First, words in the documents are filtered through the Unix standard dictionary.
This removes typos and product names, neither of which are likely to be informative. Second,
stopwords are removed using the Glasgow Information Retrieval Group’s stopword list.9 This
removes the most frequent words from the text, such as ‘the,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘to,’ as the
words are unlikely to be meaningful in context. Likewise, removing these words drastically
cuts down on the amount of text that must be processed.
Next, the remaining text is stemmed following the Porter Stemming Algorithm (Porter,
1980). This algorithm removes suffixes, allowing similar words to be classified as the same
word for later computation. Consequently, this greatly reduces the size of the vector space
required in the JST algorithm’s computation, and consequently 1) greatly decreases the
8A lexicon of positive and negative tone as part of the Multi-Perspective Question Answering corpus,
as used in Wilson, Wiebe & Hoffmann (2005). Available from University of Pittsburgh: http://mpqa.cs.
pitt.edu/
9Available at http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/resources/linguistic_utils/stop_words
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memory requirements and 2) greatly decreases the time needed to run the algorithm.
One last stopword pass is made, this time censoring any stemmed words that occur in less
than 1% of the documents or in more than 90% of the documents. This prevents words that
are outliers from taking over the disclosure topics and prevents words from being significant
across all disclosure topics (and thus having little meaning), respectively.
In order to determine the optimal number of disclosure topics for the algorithm to find,
a simulation was run. To run the simulation, 2,000 filings were selected at random. These
filings were initially run for 5 through 90 topics per sentiment (in increments of 5) and 100
topics. Based on the initial simulation results, 2 through 25 topics and 60 through 85 topics
were examined. Based on the resulting structure of the topics, two separate methodologies
were used to determine the best choice of number of disclosure topics. As there is no standard
way to determine the number of topics to use for the JST algorithm, the two methodologies
were chosen to match the specific needs of this study. In particular, since the information
content of each topic should be unique, the methods focused on maximizing the orthogonality
of the topics while also picking a larger number of topics.
The first methodology used is based on the condition number test, a test used for checking
the orthogonality of variables in a linear regression. The test describes whether or not
vectors are reasonably orthogonal. The lower the condition number is, the more orthogonal
the vectors. Taking the disclosure topics as the vectors for the condition number test, 15
disclosure topics per sentiment appears to be the optimal choice. A second test, based on
the geometry of the underlying problem, is also used. Consider the set of 𝑁 disclosure topics
after normalizing the length of each topic vector to be 1. Then the set of 𝑁 disclosure topics
can be viewed as forming an 𝑁 dimensional figure in an 𝑀 dimensional space, where 𝑀 is
the number of unique words in the data. If the disclosure topics are perfectly orthogonal,
the figure would be an 𝑁 -cube, and thus would have the maximum possible volume. On the
other hand, if any two disclosure topics were identical, then the volume would be 0. The
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more orthogonal the disclosure topics are, the larger the volume.10 By examining the volume
of the figure for different numbers of topics, an optimal number of disclosure topics can be
obtained. Based on this test, 15 is again the optimal number of topics. Both of these tests
are covered in greater detail in Appendix D.
Based on the simulation, the JST algorithm is run using 15 topics per sentiment for 800
iterations over a random sample of 10,000 documents. The output of the algorithm provides
15 different disclosure topic weightings for each of the three sentiment levels (positive, nega-
tive, and neutral). A summary of the output of the JST algorithm is presented in Appendix
E. The weighting defines to what extent each word in the sample indicates a particular topic,
and jointly indicates to what extent each word indicates a particular sentiment.
Based on this output, two primary measures are constructed. First, denote filings as 𝐹 ,
websites as 𝑊 , and media as 𝑀 . Furthermore, denote neutral content as 0, positive content
as +, and negative content as −, and let 𝐷𝑖 denote the 𝑖th disclosure topic as applied to a
document.
The first measure derived from the JST algorithm captures the extent to which content
is more positive in websites than in SEC filings at each firm-event 𝑗:
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑊,𝑗 =
15
Σ
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,+ −
15
Σ
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,−
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐹,𝑗 =
15
Σ
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,+ −
15
Σ
𝑖=1
𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,−
∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗 = 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑊,𝑗 − 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐹,𝑗. (2.1)
Thus, this measure captures the difference in disclosure tone, i.e., the tone difference, across
websites and SEC filings.
The second measure captures the difference in disclosed content between a firm’s volun-
tary disclosures via their SEC filings and website changes during the month of the filing.
10More precisely, this methodology is akin to determining the 𝑁 volume in R𝑀 of a parallelepiped with
sides parallel to the 𝑁 topic vectors.
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This measure is calculated per firm-event 𝑗 as follows,
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 = 𝑀
⎛⎝{︃ 𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,0
|𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,0 |
,
𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,+
|𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,+ |
,
𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,−
|𝐷𝑊,𝑗𝑖,− |
}︃
𝑖∈{1..15}
,
{︃
𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,0
|𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,0 |
,
𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,+
|𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,+|
,
𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,−
|𝐷𝐹,𝑗𝑖,−|
}︃
𝑖∈{1..15}
⎞⎠ (2.2)
where 𝑀(·) is the Mahalanobis distance metric. This measure is used as opposed to standard
Euclidean distance as it is unlikely that the website disclosure vectors and the SEC filing
disclosure vectors are independent of one another. Mahalanobis distance accounts for this
by taking the covariance structure of the data into account. The covariance for this is
calculated using the Minimum Covariance Determinant method, based on the least median
of squares regression of Rousseeuw (1984). This particular covariance methodology is chosen
as it increases the covariance’s robustness to outliers considerably compared to a standard
empirical covariance, an important feature given the potential noisiness of textual data. Each
sentiment vector is normalized to prevent the level of positive or negative tone from affecting
the distance measure.11
Two other text-based measures are needed. First, the tone of media, 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀,𝑗, is needed
to capture the difference between the amount of positive discussion and negative discussion
of each firm in media articles. This measure is calculated in the same way as 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑊,𝑗, but
using the text of the newspaper articles about the firm over the four weeks leading up to
event 𝑗 instead of website text. Thus, it represents the extent to which newspaper articles
about a firm are more positive or negative during the month of the SEC filing. Second, the
tone difference of competitors, ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶,𝑗, is needed to examine potential disclosure contagion
effects. The measure ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶,𝑗 is calculated as the average of ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗 for all firms in the same
GICS sector as the firm of event 𝑗 over the four weeks prior to event 𝑗.
11Results are robust to taking the Mahalanobis distance over all three sentiment types using either the
untransformed (raw) JST vectors or when calculating Mahalanobis distance within each sentiment and
summing the three resulting distances.
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2.3.4 Regressions
For all market-based tests, the dependent variable used is based on market model abnor-
mal returns, with beta calculated from daily returns over the 6 calendar months leading up
to 1 month before the filing date. A value-weighted CRSP index is used for market return.
Firms with less than 60 daily returns during the 6 month period are excluded. All tests using
more than one day of returns use buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) from the market
model (compounded returns minus compounded expected returns). In this way, any impact
of the disclosures on stock price should not affect the betas used in determining BHAR.12
To validate the tone portion of the JST measures, the distribution of ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 and is
examined. If there is a greater amount of positive content and less negative content across
firm websites compared to SEC filings, then the measure is consistent with the expectation
of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 involves the relationship between abnormal returns and both tone difference
and disclosure distance. The hypothesis is tested using equation (2.3). The dependent
variable is buy and hold abnormal returns for firm 𝑖 over the trading week starting on the
day after the filing day. This window is chosen to match the univariate analysis, discussed in
the next section. The primary independent variable of interest is the tone difference between
firm 𝑖’s SEC filings and firm 𝑖’s website during event 𝑗.
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(1,4) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗. (2.3)
The vector of controls, 𝑋, contains controls for firm characteristics that may be associated
with firm disclosures. The raw amount of disclosure via SEC filings, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 , and websites,
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 , are included to mitigate concerns that a reversal is simply due to new information
being released to the market. Likewise, size, proxied by the log of assets, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, is included,
12Results are consistent using cumulative abnormal market model returns, CAPM BHAR, and Fama-
French 3 Factor BHAR.
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as larger firms may have a greater ability to disclose. Also included is 𝑟𝑜𝑎, the return on
assets (Winsorized at 5% on both tails); 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, the revenue growth quarter-over-quarter
(Winsorized at 5% on both tails); 𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎, the long term debt to long term assets (Winsorized
at 5% on the upper tail); 𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝, research and development expense divided by total assets
(Winsorized at 5% at both tails, and set to 0 when missing), and 𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, an indicator
variable equal to 1 when 𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 is missing, else 0 (following Koh & Reeb (2015)).13 These
controls can all capture different facets of firm complexity: life cycle for 𝑟𝑜𝑎 and 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, debt
usage for 𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎, and research intensity for 𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 and 𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔. All variables are likewise
defined in Appendix B. Furthermore, year cross GICS sector fixed effects are included in
all regressions. Year fixed effects control for variation in return patterns across years (such
as recessions), while GICS sector fixed effects control for industry-specific factors, such as
industry-specific disclosure behavior.14
It is important to note that regression (2.3) is a joint test – it is both a test of managers
making strategic disclosure channel choices in order to increase stock prices as well as a
test of stock market participants’ ability to process the potentially more difficult to process
information contained in SEC filings. If managers strategically choose disclosure channels,
a positive and significant coefficient is expected for 𝛽0.
In order to examine the impact of disclosure distance, the term 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 is included in
the model. As disclosure distance exhibits high skewness (> 10), disclosure distance is
transformed into decile ranks for its inclusion in the model. If disclosure distance affects
market pricing in the short run, 𝛽1 is expected to be negative and significant.
Regression (2.3) is then examined by splitting on firms that have experienced a decrease
13Results are inferentially similar when Winsorizing controls at 1% instead of 5% for all tests.
14Most results are robust to using GICS sector cross quarter cross year fixed effects as well, however, such
a specification has potentially too little variation per industry-quarter-year, as there are 376 groups in this
specification as opposed to the 116 in the base specification. All results except for the coefficient on tone in
the post period (consistent sign, 𝑝 = 0.11 two sided) hold when using GICS sector cross quarter cross year
fixed effects.
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in net income quarter over quarter, 𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐. Firms with decreased earnings should have a
greater ability to induce a larger tone difference, as they should have less positive disclosures
in their SEC filings. A quarter-over-quarter change in earnings represents a na¨ıve view of
earnings, where the most basic expectation for earnings in the present quarter would be
the earnings from the prior quarter. Such a na¨ıve expectation biases against finding an
effect of splitting on 𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐, as some firms with an increase in net income will likely still
be viewed as poor performers (such as missing analyst expectations), and some firms with
decreased earnings may be viewed as strong performers (beating analyst expectations in
tough economic conditions). A major benefit of splitting on prior quarter income is that it
minimizes the amount of data lost, a crucial characteristic when dealing with small samples.
To examine if there are interactive effects between tone difference and disclosure distance,
equation (2.3) is rerun on two samples formed by splitting the decreasing net income sample
on the median of disclosure distance. For this specification, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 is not included in the
regression. To determine if there is an interactive effect, a Wald test is used to compare the
coefficients of the two regressions.
For the second part of Hypothesis 2, a future window is needed. Based on Figure 2.3, a
window from 1 to 8 trading weeks after the filing date is chosen (henceforth the post period).
Furthermore, subperiods of 1 to 4 weeks and 4 to 8 weeks are examined, as the univariate
analysis shows much of the reversal occurring in the second half of the post period. These
tests are identical to the tests detailed above based on regression (2.3), but with 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(5,39),
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(5,19), and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(20,39) as the dependent variables:
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(𝑡1,𝑡2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10,𝑗 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗. (2.4)
Hypothesis 3 examines managers’ incentives for making strategic disclosure channel
choices. As such, ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 become the dependent variables, and two elements of
compensation, 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 and 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, are introduced. The variable 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 is the per-
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centage of shares of a firm held by the CEO (excluding options) during the fiscal year that
the filing 𝑗 was released. This captures a general measure of ownership, which is likely cor-
related with the CEO’s number of salable shares of stock at the time of the filing, and thus
is related to the manager’s ability to capture profit from their disclosure channel choices by
selling stock. The variable 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is the number of unexercised exercisable options held
by the CEO during the fiscal year that the filing 𝑗 was released, divided by 1,000. Thus,
this captures the ability of CEOs to earn a profit from their disclosure channel choices by
exercising options. Using this, Hypothesis 3 is tested using the following regression:
𝐷𝑉𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀, (2.5)
where 𝐷𝑉𝑗 is either ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗 or 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗.
If the prediction holds that managers have incentives to try to raise the stock price in
the short run due to their stock holdings, 𝛽0 should be positive (negative) and significant
for ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡). The same pattern should likewise hold for managers’ exercisable option
holdings (𝛽1). As the skewness of the distribution of 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗 could cause concern, the regression
is also run using iteratively reweighted least squares (M estimator) following Huber (1973),
which controls for non-normality in the distribution of the dependent variable.
The remaining tests all conform to the following structure. A split is done on the variable
of interest to partition the sample into low and high subsamples. Regression equation (2.3)
is run for the low and high subsamples on the full and decreasing net income specifications.
Then, the coefficient on ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 is compared across the low and high subsamples using a Wald
test. This same procedure is then run for the post period using regression equation (2.4).
To test Hypothesis 4, liquidity is proxied by −1 times the one month average daily price
impact from Amihud (2002) following Lang & Maffett (2011), 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑. This measure is
calculated from 5 weeks before the filing date to one week before, so as to ensure that the
measure is not affected by the disclosures themselves. A median split at −0.0042 is then
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made for 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑. If 𝛽0 is higher for the high liquidity sample than for the low sample, then
the test indicates that liquidity constrains the effect of strategic disclosure channel choice in
this setting.
Hypothesis 5 introduces four other measures as potential mediators of the effect tested
in Hypothesis 2. A proxy of investor composition, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 is calculated as the percent of shares
held by institutional investors as captured by Thomson Reuters 13F.15 The proxy used for
ownership concentration, 𝐻𝐻𝐼, is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of stock ownership taken
from Thomson Reuters 13F. A median split is made on 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 (0.637), and a separate median
split is made on 𝐻𝐻𝐼 (0.0580). The regressions are re-run for these subsamples. If 𝛽0 is
higher for the high institutional ownership sample than for the low sample, then the test
indicates that institutional ownership constrains the effect of strategic disclosure channel
choice in this setting.
The effect of media coverage is tested in a similar manner. A median split is made on
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 (−0.0010), such that the low subsample represents firm events during which newspaper
articles were more critical of the firm. If the media is able to mitigate the effect of strategic
disclosure channel choices, then 𝛽0 should be lower for the low 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 subsample on the
announcement date and higher during the post period when compared to 𝛽0 for the high
subsample.
Analyst coverage is calculated an indicator of whether any analyst released quarterly or
annual earnings guidance on the firm for event 𝑗 during the 90 days prior to the event.16
Analyst earnings guidance is derived from the I/B/E/S Detail, Excluded Estimates, and
Stopped Estimate files. Firms with no listed analyst earnings guidance are assumed to have
no coverage. If analysts are able to mitigate the effect of strategic disclosure channel choices,
then 𝛽0 should be lower for the high analyst coverage subsample on the announcement date
15This measure can be improved to capture only actively trading institutional investors following Bushee
& Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001).
16Results are weaker when using a 30 day window.
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and higher during the post period when compared to 𝛽0 for the low subsample.
Lastly, the effect of strategic disclosure by competitors is tested similarly. A median
split is made on ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 (0.1890), such that the low subsample represents firm events during
which other firms in the industry did not have high tone difference over the four weeks prior.
If there is an aspect of accounting contagion, it is expected that the high tone subsample
would see lower positive returns shortly after filing dates and lower negative returns during
the post period when compared to the low subsample.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Strategic disclosure channel choices
This section explores the possibility of managers making strategic disclosure channel
choices. First, in order for such choices to occur under the theory presented in Section 2.2,
at least some firms must have websites with more positive voluntary disclosure than their SEC
filings. Figure 2.1 plots the average amount of positive and negative voluntary disclosure over
time separately for paired website and SEC filing disclosures. From 2001 to 2014, the amount
of positive and negative voluntary disclosure in SEC filings has been remarkably consistent.
For all years since 2001, the average amount of negative voluntary disclosure content has been
greater than the average amount of positive voluntary disclosure content. For websites, the
amount of positive and negative voluntary disclosure content on firm websites has also been
remarkably consistent, with the average amount of positive voluntary disclosure across firm
websites being greater than the average amount of negative voluntary disclosure in all years.
Overall, this indicates that website-based voluntary disclosures are, on average, more positive
than voluntary disclosures in SEC filings across the entire sample. This is as expected from
Hypothesis 1, and helps to validate the sentiment portion of the JST measures.
In order to assess the variability of the ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 measures, Figure 2.2 plots the
kernel density functions of the two variables. The kernel density represents a smoothed
estimation of the probability density function underlying the empirical distributions of the
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variables. In Panel A, the kernel density for ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 is presented. From the kernel density,
we can see that, on average, a firm’s website is more positive than the firm’s filing. Despite
this, there is a significant amount of variability, with 13% of firms exhibiting negative values
for ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒. Furthermore, the kernel density appears normal in shape. Panel B presents
the kernel density of 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡. This density exhibits a long right tail, with a large amount of
clustering at lower values.
Lastly, Figure 2.3 plots buy and hold abnormal returns (market model based) centered
around the SEC filing date. In the top graph, abnormal returns are split on the median
of ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒. When ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 is in the top 50%, we see a spike upwards at by day 3 – that is,
we see a positive abnormal reaction in these firms’ stock prices following the filing release.
Furthermore, from days 20 and 39, firms in the top 50% of ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 exhibit an abnormal
decrease in stock price, on average. Firms with ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 below the median, on the other hand,
appear to perform poorly over the first 4 days, but stabilize shortly after. Taken together,
the spike upward and slow diffusion downward for firms with ∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 differences above the
median indicates initial support for managers’ strategic disclosure channel choices.
The second graph depicts BHAR split on disclosure distance. From the graph, it appears
that firms with higher disclosure distance perform better than those with lower disclosure
distance. The bottom graph depicts a split on both tone difference and disclosure distance.
Over the first 20 days, the high tone difference and low disclosure distance events appear
to outperform the other 3 event types. However, over the subsequent 20 days, this group
performs much worse than the other groups, reverting the gains over the first 20 days.
Based on this graphical analysis, an initial window of days 1 to 4 is chosen, and a post
period through day 39 (8 trading weeks after day 0, inclusive) is chosen. Day 0 is excluded
from the initial window as some filings are released after trading hours, and consequently
a period of days 1 to 4 allows for a cleaner separation between the time when the filing is
created and the time when the information in the filing could be traded on.17 Furthermore,
17Results are consistent when using a window of days 0 through 4.
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based on the pattern observed in the first and third graphs, the post period is split in two
around day 20.
2.4.2 Return test
This section formally tests the occurrence of stock return patterns indicative of strategic
disclosure channel choices. Table 2.1 presents univariate statistics for all variables used in the
main analyses. For the return tests, 2,671 firms events are examined, spanning 196 unique
firms. Firm events range from November 2000 to December 2014. Perhaps surprisingly,
firm websites, on average, contain 23% more disclosure content (weighted counts from the
JST algorithm) than the voluntary portion of 10-K and 10-Q filings, on average. This is
driven by a small portion of the observations, however, as firms’ SEC filings contains more
voluntary disclosure than the firms’ websites for over 67% of observations. Panel D of Table
2.1 presents the industry distribution in the sample. Unsurprisingly, there is a heavier weight
toward information technology firms, potentially due to bias in the website sample. It may be
that these firms were more likely to use a website in early years, or that these firms’ websites
were easier for The Internet Archive to find or that the websites were more in demand
by the service’s users. Industry distributions across subsamples divided on tone difference
and disclosure distance are fairly consistent, except for a larger percentage of information
technology firms in the high tone difference with low disclosure distance subsample. Pearson
correlations for all variables in the sample are presented in Table 2.2. Here, a negative
relationship between tone difference and disclosure distance is found. As strategic disclosure
channel choices are argued to be most effective when tone difference is high and disclosure
distance is low, this correlation is as expected.
In untabulated univariate tests, I find that over half of the firms in the data set exhibit
disclosure behavior with high tone difference and low disclosure distance in at least one
quarter (102 of 196 firms). Furthermore, autocorrelation for this disclosure pattern is about
0.50 (0.54 for firms with decreasing net income in consecutive quarters), indicating that there
is substantial turnover quarter-over-quarter in the firms exhibiting high tone difference paired
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with low disclosure distance. Individually, high tone difference exhibits an autocorrelation
of 0.43 while low disclosure distance exhibits an autocorrelation of 0.54.
Table 2.3 presents the test of Hypothesis 2. Over the week following (but excluding)
the filing date, firms with decreasing net income exhibit higher abnormal returns when they
have a higher tone difference (𝑝 = 0.038). For firms whose net income increased, no effect is
found. This result is as expected, as a firm with decreasing net income is more likely to be
experiencing problems, thus there is both more room to adjust the framing of a disclosure
on a firm’s website as well as potentially more incentive to do so. No significant results are
found for disclosure distance over this interval. Likewise, no significant difference in tone
difference coefficients is found when splitting on the median of disclosure distance. As such,
it appears that tone difference is related to the increase in stock price after the filing date. As
a control, a period of 2 weeks prior to the filing date is examined as well. Across this period,
tone difference is not found to be significantly related to returns under any subsample.
In order to test the delayed response to the content of the SEC filing, a window of days 5
to 39 is used. This captures a broad range around the negative returns as depicted in Figure
2.3. The other three panels of Table 2.3 detail the tests of the delayed response, looking
at the full post period and each half of the post period. Over the full post period (untab-
ulated), tone difference negatively predicts BHAR (𝑝 = 0.031), while disclosure distance is
again insignificant. This is likewise true for firms with decreasing net income (𝑝 = 0.021).
Interestingly, no significant results are found in the first half of the post period, whereas
significant results are found in the second half. For decreasing net income firms over trading
days 20 through 39, tone difference is negatively related to BHAR (𝑝 = 0.079), while disclo-
sure distance is positively related to returns (𝑝 = 0.065). This indicates that firms with high
tone difference and low disclosure distance see a larger reversal over the second half of the
post period, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
One potential concern is that, given the one month window for the website changes, the
price changes may be due to new information. However, re-running the test on the days 20
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to 39 window while removing firms with 1 month intervals overlapping the days 20 to 39
trading day window yields inferentially similar results (untabulated). As such, at least the
reversal in the post period is unlikely to be due to new information on the website.
Taken together, the evidence indicates that at least some managers could use the presence
of multiple disclosure channels for their (short run) benefit, as disclosing with higher tone
difference and lower disclosure distance appears to provide a window, from 1 to 4 weeks after
the filing, where a firm’s stock price is predictably higher. As this effect does not appear to
persist past two months, it does not appear to reflect a long term change in firm performance.
2.4.3 Management incentives
While the previous section has documented the expected outcome from strategic dis-
closure channel choices in stock market returns, managers’ incentive to strategically choose
disclosure channels has not yet been examined. This section examines how management in-
centives, proxied by aspects of compensation, are related to the disclosure outcomes of tone
difference and disclosure distance. This section further examines managers’ incentives by
examining if managers appear to trade differently based on their firms’ disclosure patterns.
Table 2.4 presents the regression results testing Hypothesis 3, that disclosure behavior is
related to compensation factors. As expected, CEO stock holdings are positively related to
tone difference (𝑝 = 0.023); however, stock holdings are not significantly related to disclo-
sure distance. Exercisable stock option holdings are found to be positively related to tone
difference (𝑝 < 0.001) and negatively related to disclosure distance (𝑝 = 0.031). Each of this
results is consistent when using robust regression following Huber (1973) (untabulated). As
such, it appears that managers have an incentive to strategically choose disclosure channels
when they hold more exercisable stock options, and, to a lesser degree, when they hold more
shares of stock. This is in line with Hypothesis 3, as it shows that managers have a finan-
cial incentive to want a higher stock price for their firm, even if the stock price increase is
short-lived.
To provide more concrete evidence as to whether managers’ are incentivized to adopt
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a strategy of high tone difference and low disclosure distance across disclosure channels, I
examine managers’ trades surrounding filing dates as captured by SEC Form 4. In particular,
I examine trades of common shares that the SEC records as purchases, sales, grants/awards,
and dispositions (codes P, S, A, and D, respectively), classifying purchases and grants/awards
as inflows and sales and dispositions as outflows. In order to compare across groups, all
inflows and outflows are normalized by the number of shares held by the executive. In order
to match Form 4s to current CEOs, I use BoardEx to identify the current CEO at each filing
date.
Figure 2.4 charts cumulative average CEO selling activity from 10 trading days before
the filing date to 50 trading days after the filing date. The top chart depicts stock outflows
across all CEOs in captured in the sample. The chart shows a clear pattern: from shortly
after the filing date through day 20, CEOs at a firm that disclosed with high tone difference
and low disclosure distance sell a larger portion of their shares than other CEOs. Over
the span of 50 trading days, the gap in sales never reverts. However, the increased selling
appears to level off after day 20. The bottom chart shows a similar pattern for only the firms
with decreasing net income quarter-over-quarter. Given that the share price appears to be
mispriced upward during this time period (on average), this indicates that some CEOs may
be taking advantage of the inflated stock price, enriching themselves at the expense of other
market participants.
Table 2.5 further examines CEOs’ trades around filing announcements in a univariate
manner. In Panel A, which shows selling over different time horizons, CEOs at firms with
high tone difference and low disclosure decrease their stock holding significantly more than
other CEOs from days 5 through 19 (𝑝 = 0.0072), corresponding to the period that the stock
is priced higher in the abnormal returns analysis. Panel B shows that this result is indeed
a result of CEO stock sales, as CEO’s buying patterns are not significantly different during
this period, but CEO selling patterns are (𝑝 = 0.0168).
Table 2.6 examines trading using a regression structure following regression equations
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(2.3) and (2.4), but with CEO selling as the dependent variable. Under this structure, I
find that there is no statistically significant relationship between disclosure patterns and
selling before the filing date, in the four days after the filing date, or from days 20 to 39.
However, the results show a positive and significant relationship between tone difference and
CEO selling from days 5 to 19 for firms experiencing a decrease in net income (𝑝 = 0.051).
This relationship is found in the same subset that appears to be experiencing a temporarily
elevated price from days 5 to 19, indicating that managers do appear to be trading in a
manner consistent with strategic use of the two disclosure channels. The effect on trading is
economically significant, with a one standard deviation increase in tone difference amounting
to 2.69% more of a CEO’s holdings being sold during the days 5 to 19 window, which is a
14.3% increase compared to the mean amount of shares sold (18.79%).
Taken together, this evidence indicates that at least some CEOs at firms with high tone
difference and low disclosure distance appear to be trading in a manner consistent with the
managers capturing a benefit from strategic disclosure.
2.4.4 Mitigation of strategic disclosure channel choice effects
This section examines potential aspects of the market and information dissemination that
could curtail the effects of strategic disclosure channel choices on stock prices.
The first factor examined is liquidity. As discussed in Section 2.2, liquidity can help a
market to impound information more quickly into prices. On the other hand, liquidity may
also allow noise traders to quickly impound misleading information into the market price.
Table 2.7, Panel A tests Hypothesis 4. When splitting on the median of liquidity, there are
no significantly different coefficients in the period following the filing date. However, during
the second half of the post period, the high liquidity subsample has significantly higher
coefficients on tone difference and significantly lower coefficients on disclosure distance across
both presented specifications (full and decreasing net income). As such, it appears as though
the reversal is largely concentrated in low liquidity firms. This result is weakly in agreement
with the expected direction of Hypothesis 4, as no effect is found around the filing date, but
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the post period results are in line with liquidity preventing the effects of strategic disclosure
channel choices.
The remaining panels of Table 2.7 test factors related to processing costs discussed in
Hypothesis 5. In the period after the filing date, no factors appear to have an effect on
the coefficient of tone difference. However, analyst coverage (Panel E) appears to interact
with disclosure distance. For firms with decreasing net income, firms with analyst coverage
over the prior 3 month have a significantly lower coefficient on disclosure distance than firms
without any analyst coverage (𝑝 = 0.002). It appears as though firms with analyst coverage
are penalized more for having a larger disclosure distance when compared against firms
without recent analyst coverage.
In the post period, results are largely clustered in the second half of the period. In
this period, however, only institutional ownership (Panel B) and ownership concentration
(Panel C) appear to have an effect. Among firms with decreasing net income, firms with
lower institutional ownership see a larger reversal related to tone difference (𝑝 = 0.038). As
such, it is possible that institutional ownership may help in impounding information into the
stock price more quickly. This is corroborated by the negative and significant coefficient on
tone difference (𝑝 = 0.086) in the first half of the post period for high institutional ownership
firms. Furthermore, in the full sample, firms with higher ownership concentration see a larger
reversal due to tone difference (𝑝 = 0.049) and a larger reversal when disclosure distance
is low (𝑝 < 0.001). The latter affect persists in the decreasing net income subset of firms
(𝑝 = 0.039). This suggests that having a larger group of institutional investors may prevent
some inefficiencies of impounding disclosures.
2.5 Robustness and endogeneity
This section provides details of supplemental tests that check some of the underlying
assumptions of the primary analysis. The first part of this section covers robustness checks,
while the second part of this section discusses and examines endogeneity within the analysis.
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2.5.1 Robustness
The following tests cover the structure of the distance measure, the assumption on the
number of topics in the filings, whether all topics are needed, and the use of BHAR and
abnormal returns.
To verify that the choice of distance metric does not bias the results, two other measures
are employed. The first measure, raw 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡, uses non-normed vectors in place of the normed
vectors in equation (2.2), allowing for an unaltered covariance matrix to be employed when
calculating distances. The second measure calculates the Mahalanobis distance by sentiment,
and then sums the three resulting distances. As such, it ignores any possible correlations
in disclosures across the three sentiment levels. The results in Table 2.8 show that both of
these measures lead to similar inferences around the filing date and in the post period. As
such, the stock return results are robust to the choice of distance metric.
Next, the number of topics is examined. A model using 62 topics per sentiment, as
opposed to the original 15 topics per sentiment model, was chosen as a balance between
increasing the number of topics and maintaining reasonable computation time (1 week).
The JST algorithm was re-run following the methodology outlined in Section 2.3.3.18 Using
this new 62 topic model, the main regressions were re-examined, and a summary of the
results are included in Table 2.8. Using this methodology, full sample results and results on
the decreasing/increasing net income subsamples are inferentially similar for both the filing
date returns as well as for the post period. That being said, the significance level of each
result is lower, indicating that the choice of the number of topics may affect the results.
This result is likely due to the introduction of a lack of orthogonality into the disclosure
topics by choosing a large number of topics (62) and consequently decreasing the power of
the measure.
The second check examines whether any individual sentiment from the JST algorithm
18The model was only run for 600 iterations as, after 6 days of computation, a power outage cut the
computation short.
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is sufficient to induce the return results found in the main analysis. For this test, tone
difference was measured per sentiment instead of in aggregate, and disclosure distance was
taken to be the disclosure distance within the sentiment. Three specifications are examined:
positive, negative, and neutral sentiment. Regressions using these measures are included in
Table 2.8. In the period following the filing, positive sentiment appears to be predict the
same results, though negative and neutral sentiment do not. Likewise, in the post period,
positive sentiment again captures the effect of tone difference, though disclosure distance
is inferentially similar to the return analysis for neutral sentiment. It is noteworthy that
positive sentiment may be driving at least some of the return results, as this goes counter
to the finding of Davis & Tama-Sweet (2012) that a difference in negative sentiment drives
long run market returns.
Lastly, other return variables were introduced. In particular, raw buy and hold return,
market model CAR (as opposed to BHAR), CAPM BHAR, and Fama-French 3 Factor BHAR
are considered. These specifications are included in Table 2.8. Results for raw return are
consistent during the period immediately following the filing date, but are not consistent in
the post period. This may be due to the amount of noise introduced by using raw return.
Under market model CAR, CAPM BHAR, and Fama-French 3 Factor BHAR, the results
are all inferentially similar to those of the main analysis. This indicates that the choice of
BHAR versus CAR has little effect on the results of the study, as does the choice of abnormal
return type.
2.5.2 Endogeneity
As with any archival study, endogeneity is a potential issue. Steps in the design of the
study were taken to avoid endogeneity biases of omitted variables, measurement error, and
simultaneity.
To avoid omitted variable biases, a large number of controls were included in the analyses,
covering firm type (such as size), performance (such as growth and roa), and disclosure
content (amount of filing and web content). Furthermore, the inclusion of industry (GICS
72
sector) cross year fixed effects should control for any omitted factors that are industry specific
or time specific (yearly), or even factors that affected a particular industry within a subset
of years.
To control for measurement error, a number of techniques were employed. For the the
returns variables, a number of well-established models are implemented. The main test
employs a buy and hold market model, and similar results are found in robustness checks
when employing a cumulative abnormal returns market model, a buy and hold CAPM model,
and a buy and hold Fama-French 3-factor model. For the disclosure distance measure, a
robust distance metric is constructed by implementing a Mahalanobis distance measure with
least median of squares following Rousseeuw (1984), which controls for correlations across
content types and minimizes the effect of noise on the covariance matrix used in calculating
distances. Furthermore, a raw distance measure as well as a summed distance measure
are tested in the robustness checks, leading to similar findings. As a check for both the
tone difference and disclosure distance measures, a second JST model is run using 62 topics
per sentiment as opposed to 15 topics per sentiment. This model finds inferentially similar
results, showing that the result is robust to changes in one of the more critical assumptions
used by the JST algorithm in analyzing disclosure content.
Lastly, to prevent issues with simultaneity bias, all data used follows a strict ordering. In
particular, the compensation incentive data is determined as of the fiscal quarter end. The
tone distance and disclosure distance measures are determined after the fiscal quarter end and
before the filing is released. Lastly, the return and trade results are (excluding the (−10,−1)
window used as a control) determined after the date of the filing. Consequently, when the
disclosure measures are used as a dependent variable, there is a clear time separation in
that the disclosure measures are determined after the compensation measures have been
fixed. Likewise, for the regressions where the disclosure measures are treated as exogenous
variables, the dependent variables are determined after the day of the filing.
To further ensure that endogeneity is not an issue, I run Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests as
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shown in Nakamura & Nakamura (1981) to examine if an instrumental variable methodology
is warranted for the return regressions. For instruments I use the amount of neutral content
in the filings and websites, as the amount of neutral content does not have a significant
Pearson correlation with any of the BHAR measures, yet is significantly correlated with
both the tone difference and disclosure distance measures. Furthermore, using the amount
of neutral content leads to no sample attrition. I run Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests across
all five windows examined in this paper: (−10,−1), (1, 4), (5, 19), (20, 39), and (5, 39).
Furthermore, I test instrumenting tone difference and disclosure distance both together and
separately. Tone difference is significantly negatively related to both instruments, while
disclosure distance is positively related to both instruments. In all 15 cases (5 windows by
3 specifications), the test statistic has a non-significant p-value (𝑝 > 0.10). This implies
that instrumenting in all of these cases does not appear to be appropriate, indicating that
endogeneity is not likely to be an issue in the return tests.
2.6 Conclusion
This study employs a large sample of textual data on voluntary disclosures via SEC
filings and firm websites to examine how managers use multiple channels for voluntary dis-
closure. Systematic differences across channels are found, indicating that managers appear
to use these channels differently. In examining the differences in disclosures across disclosure
channels, this study demonstrates a previously undocumented way in which managers can
influence the stock price of their firm: through strategic choice of disclosure channels. Un-
der this strategy, managers disclose information on similar topics across multiple channels,
but disclose more positive information through easier to process disclosure channels and dis-
close more negative information through harder to process disclosure channels. By making
strategic disclosure channel choices, managers can increase their firms’ stock prices in the
short run. This disclosure behavior and stock market effect is empirically documented by
examining voluntary disclosures through firms’ websites and SEC filings.
Furthermore, this study documents a link between strategic disclosure channel choices
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and managerial incentives through compensation and trading. Managers with greater stock
holdings and more exercisable options appear to disclose more positive voluntary disclosures
through their firms’ websites than through their firms’ SEC filings while simultaneously
discussing more similar topics across these two disclosure channels. Furthermore, CEOs at
firms exhibiting higher tone difference and lower disclosure distance sell more stock during
the subsequent four weeks (while the stock price is higher) than other managers. Thus,
managers with a greater incentive to increase stock price in the short run appear to be more
likely to make strategic disclosure channel choices and to act on these incentives.
Higher liquidity appears to constrain the stock price effects of managers’ strategic dis-
closure channel choices, at least bringing stock prices in line more quickly. On the other
hand, institutional investors do not appear capable of constraining the stock price effects
of strategic disclosure channel choices. This latter result is consistent with the findings of
Tetlock (2011) that institutional investors cannot necessarily prevent mispricing in the short
run.
Overall, this paper identifies a particular disclosure strategy that investors should be
careful of, as it appears to lead to investors paying more for some firms’ stock around quarter
and year end filings than should be expected given the information that is publicly available.
Likewise, the findings of this paper may indicate another benefit of the SEC’s initiative on
using plain English in company reports, as decreasing the difficulty of processing SEC fillings
could lead to less benefit to managers from making strategic disclosure channel choices, and
likewise less cost to investors due to such strategies.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Website and filing tone across time
This figure plots the average percentage of positive and negative text for SEC filings and websites. The
post Reg-FD sample is based on the sample of 2,671 observations used in the main tests (see Section 2.4.2).
The pre-Reg FD sample consists of 139 firm-month observations that had both a website change and a 10-K
or 10-Q filing under all the other same restrictions as the main sample. SEC filing information is given
by the grey lines, while website information is given by the black lines. Solid lines represent the percent
of disclosure that is positive, while dashed lines represent the percent of disclosure that is negative. The
vertical black line on the figure indicates the implementation date of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
76
Figure 2.2: Kernel densities for independent variables
Tone difference density
Disclosure distance density
This figure presents the kernel density functions of tone difference (top) and disclosure distance (bot-
tom). A kernel density function is a smoothed estimate of the density found in the empirical distributions.
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Figure 2.3: Abnormal returns around filing dates
Split on tone
Split on disclosure distance
Split on tone and disclosure distance, Firms with decreasing net income
This figure plots daily abnormal returns (market model) around filing dates. The filing date is taken to
be day 0. The top chart shows abnormal returns splitting by the median of tone difference, the second chart
shows abnormal returns splitting by the median of disclosure distance, and the bottom chart splits on both.
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Figure 2.4: CEO selling around filing dates
All firms
Firms with decreasing net income
This figure plots CEO stock selling behavior starting at 10 days before the filing date (day 0). The top
chart plots out the average selling of common equity shares as a percentage of the CEO’s total holdings on
day 0, cumulatively. The bottom chart plots the same selling metric for only those firms that experience
a decrease in net income quarter-over-quarter for the filing event. In both charts, the solid line represents
CEOs across firm-quarters with high tone difference and low disclosure distance.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Univariate statistics
Panel A: Return variables
N Mean Std Dev Median
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 2671 −0.0037 0.113 −0.0076
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 2668 −0.0012 0.065 −0.0021
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 2657 0.0004 0.109 −0.0042
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39) 2629 −0.0047 0.138 −0.0081
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,39) 2629 −0.0045 0.187 −0.0116
Panel B: Independent variables
N Mean Std Dev Median
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 2671 0.168 0.161 0.173
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 2671 15.3 7.7 13.1
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 987 1.29 3.14 0.245
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 987 0.493 0.923 0.247
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 2666 1.2 30.1 0.0042
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 2471 0.637 0.272 0.706
𝐻𝐻𝐼 2471 0.0949 0.106 0.058
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 879 0.0103 0.132 −0.001
𝐴𝑛𝑎 2671 6.36 14.3 +0
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 2184 0.179 0.111 0.189
Panel C: Control variables
N Mean Std Dev Median
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 2671 6.38 1.83 6.19
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 2671 223 233 137
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 2671 274 856 58.3
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 2671 0.0324 0.174 0.0242
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 2671 0.418 0.334 0.367
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 2671 0.477 0.5 +0
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 2671 0.0129 0.021 +0
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 2671 0.418 0.493 +0
𝑟𝑜𝑎 2671 0.0036 0.0316 0.0106
Continued on the next page
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Table 2.1: Univariate statistics (Continued)
Panel D: Industry breakdown (Percentage)
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 ↑ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 ↓
GICS Sector All 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑
Energy (10) 10.56 2.93 11.47 14.19 14.25
Materials (15) 7.68 6.01 5.82 11.29 7.82
Industrials (20) 12.32 9.22 17.93 9.35 13.13
Consumer discretionary (25) 16.06 18.16 14.22 13.39 17.88
Consumer staples (30) 5.77 1.40 8.24 5.81 7.96
Health car (35) 14.83 10.34 13.25 17.74 18.16
Information technology (45) 30.66 50.14 26.66 25.65 18.99
Telecommunications services (50) 0.75 1.26 1.13 0.32 0.28
Utilities (55) 1.39 0.56 1.29 2.26 1.54
Observations 2671 716 619 620 716
This table presents various summary statistics of the data employed in this study. Variable definitions
are available in Appendix B.
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Table 2.2: Pearson correlations
Panel A: Return variables
With return variables
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) −0.0224
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 0.0059 0.025
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39) −0.0607*** −0.03 0.0656***
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,39) −0.0542*** −0.0052 0.655*** 0.783***
With independent variables
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,39)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0332* 0.0313 −0.0216 −0.029 −0.0373*
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 −0.0117 −0.028 −0.0115 0.0141 0.0059
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 0.0246 −0.0106 −0.0251 0.0185 0.0006
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 −0.0111 0.027 −0.0218 −0.0641** −0.0639**
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 −0.0113 0.0229 −0.0427** 0.0601*** 0.0165
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 0.0227 0.0379* 0.0196 0.0139 0.0225
𝐻𝐻𝐼 0.0054 −0.016 −0.0091 0.0196 0.0129
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 0.0759
** −0.032 0.023 −0.0426 −0.0179
𝐴𝑛𝑎 0.0031 0.0212 0.0174 0.0075 0.0207
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 0.0185 0.0343 0.022 −0.0277 −0.0089
With controls
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,39)
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.0363* 0.027 0.0105 0.0056 0.0132
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 0.0105 0.0141 0.0325
* −0.0249 0.0047
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 0.0169 0.0217 0.0094 0.0009 0.0087
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0084 0.019 −0.0131 −0.0261 −0.0249
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 0.0064 −0.0073 0.0061 −0.0109 −0.0045
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0349* −0.011 0.0404** 0.0029 0.0265
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.01 0.0229 0.0117 −0.0001 0.0018
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.0018 −0.0587*** −0.0278 0.0138 −0.0027
𝑟𝑜𝑎 −0.0029 0.0027 −0.0271 0.002 −0.0123
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82
Table 2.2: Pearson correlations (Continued)
Panel B: Independent variables
With independent variables
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 𝐴𝑛𝑎
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 −0.1***
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 0.0362 0.101***
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 0.0942*** 0.127*** −0.0884***
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 −0.0005 −0.002 0.013 −0.0231
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 0.0876*** −0.168*** −0.237*** 0.054 −0.0628***
𝐻𝐻𝐼 −0.0842*** 0.147*** 0.147*** −0.112*** 0.0559*** −0.611***
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 −0.134*** 0.0234 0.0268 −0.0534 0.0102 −0.0338 0.002
𝐴𝑛𝑎 −0.0015 −0.0939*** −0.0758** 0.0114 −0.0163 0.195*** −0.129*** 0.0545
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 0.0637
*** −0.104*** 0.045 −0.0358 0.0046 0.0733*** −0.0115 −0.0475 −0.0035
With controls
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 𝐴𝑛𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.114*** −0.198*** −0.241*** 0.178*** −0.0581*** 0.507*** −0.452*** −0.022 0.35*** −0.0012
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 −0.077*** −0.123*** −0.0224 0.194*** −0.0157 0.0857*** −0.128*** 0.0012 0.0274 −0.0666***
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 0.0425
** −0.129*** −0.0774** −0.0607* −0.0076 0.009 −0.0302 −0.0663** 0.0758*** 0.0387*
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.017 0.017 0.0982*** 0.0248 −0.0071 −0.0579*** 0.0207 0.0208 0.0063 −0.0064
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 0.0994*** −0.145*** −0.25*** 0.0868*** −0.0261 0.13*** −0.129*** −0.049 0.0591*** 0.0249
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0106 −0.0038 −0.0139 0.0753** −0.0271 0.0245 −0.0319 0.0531 −0.0119 −0.0026
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.0452** −0.097*** −0.0926*** 0.151*** 0.0224 −0.0589*** 0.0098 −0.106*** −0.0848*** 0.108***
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 −0.0684*** 0.0358* 0.133*** −0.203*** −0.0245 −0.0994*** 0.075*** 0.131*** 0.0705*** −0.15***
𝑟𝑜𝑎 0.0351* 0.0732*** 0.0803** −0.043 −0.0045 0.156*** −0.15*** 0.0225 0.0494** −0.0264
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Table 2.2: Pearson correlations (Continued)
Panel C: Controls
With controls
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 0.241
***
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 0.0353
* 0.0162
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0146 −0.015 0.0014
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 0.372*** 0.153*** 0.0042 −0.0224
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0146 0.0372* −0.0269 −0.373*** 0.0028
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.347*** −0.0041 0.0149 0.0222 −0.0828*** 0.0346*
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.197*** −0.0141 −0.063*** 0.0156 0.0559*** −0.0816*** −0.521***
𝑟𝑜𝑎 0.218*** −0.04** −0.0518*** 0.158*** −0.0793*** −0.28*** −0.439*** 0.171***
This table shows Pearson correlations between each variable used in the study. Variable definitions are available in Appendix B. Significance
levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: *** denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.84
Table 2.3: Stock reaction around filing dates
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4)
(𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0219 0.0227 0.0171 0.0077 0.028** −0.0076
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.0023 0.0042* 0.0011 0.002** 0.0008 0.0021*
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 +0 +0 −0 +0 +0** −0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 +0 +0 +0 +0 −0 +0
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0128 −0.0044 −0.0249 0.0065 0.0186 −0.0001
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 −0.0027 −0.0204* 0.011 −0.0052 −0.0066 −0.0013
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0125** – – −0.0012 – –
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 0.0461 −0.245 0.21 0.0178 0.0437 −0.0243
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 0.0016 0.0057 −0.0061 −0.007** −0.0124** −0.0033
𝑟𝑜𝑎 −0.0521 −0.153 0.032 −0.0083 0.0668 −0.0527
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 −0.0144 −0.0333* −0.0061 −0.0124 −0.0095 −0.0079
𝑅2 0.005 0.0102 0.006 0.0051 0.0179 0.0051
𝑁 2671 1275 1396 2668 1273 1395
(𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0297 0.0464* 2.78* 0.0367 0.0341* 0.01
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0271 −0.0441* −0.0219 −0.0531** −0.0831** −0.0351
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 0.0015 0.0028
* 0.0008 0.001 0.003 0.0001
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.0023 0.0033 0.0028 0.0034 0.005 0.0034
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 −0 −0 −0** −0 +0 −0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 +0 +0 −0 +0 +0* +0
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0267 −0.0298 −0.0134 −0.0166 −0.024 −0.0029
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 −0.0032 −0.0047 +0 −0.0041 −0.0033 0.0006
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0019 – – 0.0078 – –
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 0.127 0.0661 0.416 −0.0548 −0.316 0.368
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 0.0061 −0.0042 0.0211** −0.0014 −0.0181 0.0217
𝑟𝑜𝑎 0.0363 0.202 −0.0174 −0.0499 −0.0926 0.211
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 −0.0199 −0.0331 −0.0288 −0.0226 −0.0342 −0.0353
𝑅2 0.004 0.0117 0.0082 0.0036 0.014 0.0053
𝑁 2629 1247 1382 2629 1247 1382
(𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0233 −0.0374 0.09 0.0351 −0.0563 2.91*
This table shows the results of the test of Hypothesis 2, using regression equations (2.3) and and (2.4) over four windows.
In the top portion of all windows, the columns present results for the full sample, firms with increased net income for the quarter,
and firms with decreased net income for the quarter. The bottom portion presents results when splitting the decreasing net
income sample by the median of disclosure distance, with the third column denoting a Wald test for the difference in coefficient
values (𝜒2(1)). Variable definitions are available in Appendix B. All regressions include year times GICS sector fixed effects.
Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: *** denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.
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Table 2.4: Management incentives and disclosure choices
(Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡)
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 0.0041** 0.0525
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 0.0418*** −1.0**
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.0112** −0.841***
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 −0.0001*** −0.0023**
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 +0
** −0.002***
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0174 −1.82
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 0.0338** −1.19
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0119 0.045
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.257 7.25
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.0268* −0.304
𝑟𝑜𝑎 −0.534** 15.3
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 0.0981*** 22.9***
𝑅2 0.0993 0.0952
𝑁 987 987
This table shows the results of the test of Hypothesis 3, using regression equation (2.5). The first
column shows results for tone difference, and the second column shows results for disclosure distance. Vari-
able definitions are available in Appendix B. All regressions include year times GICS sector fixed effects.
Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: *** denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and
* denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.
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Table 2.5: Management trading around filing dates
Panel A: Aggregate selling by week
From Day 0 From Day 5 From Day 20
Day 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff
4 0.133 0.0998 **
9 0.205 0.157 *** 0.108 0.0805 **
14 0.264 0.197 *** 0.175 0.131 ***
19 0.302 0.23 *** 0.223 0.173 ***
24 0.335 0.259 *** 0.261 0.203 *** 0.0828 0.0579 *
29 0.361 0.276 *** 0.29 0.224 *** 0.12 0.0897 *
34 0.374 0.295 *** 0.308 0.244 *** 0.142 0.115
39 0.393 0.315 *** 0.328 0.267 *** 0.167 0.143
Panel B: By trade type
Day −10 to −1 Day 1 to 4 Day 5 to 19 Day 20 to 39
Trades 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff 𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓ Other Diff
Sold 0.16 0.101 *** 0.108 0.0714 *** 0.223 0.173 *** 0.167 0.143
Bought 0.0867 0.0631 0.0509 0.0691 0.209 0.155 0.0885 0.0904
This table examines CEO trading following 10-K and 10-Q filing dates. Columns with the heading “𝑇 ↑ 𝐷 ↓” show trading information for
firms with above median tone difference and below median disclosure distance, while columns with the heading “Other” show trading information
for all other firms. Columns labeled “Diff” indicate whether the difference between the two groups is significant. The filing date is taken to be day
0, and all other days are in terms of trading days. Panel A shows cumulative sales by CEOs over different periods, while Panel B shows cumulative
sales and purchases by CEOs over specific periods. Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: *** denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes
𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.
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Table 2.6: Stock selling around filing dates
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑(−10,−1) 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑(1,4)
(𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0818 −0.106 −0.0641 0.0006 0.0549 −0.0367
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0036 −0.0016 −0.0075* −0.0023 −0.0003 −0.0029
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 −0.0225*** −0.0255*** −0.0232*** 0.0136*** 0.0091 0.0167***
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 −0.0001** −0.0001** −0.0001 −0 +0 −0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 +0 +0 +0 +0
* +0 +0
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ −0.0112 0.0537 −0.0523 −0.0014 −0.0313 −0.0075
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 −0.0219 −0.031 −0.008 −0.0355* −0.0328 −0.0346
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 −0.0084 – – −0.0009 – –
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.951* −1.57** −0.475 0.169 0.137 0.311
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 −0.0174 −0.0169 −0.028 0.0068 0.0135 0.0061
𝑟𝑜𝑎 −0.54* −1.19*** 0.341 0.588** 0.679** 0.497
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 0.112** 0.135** 0.116* 0.0118 0.0135 0.0039
𝑅2 0.0268 0.0514 0.0206 0.0212 0.0222 0.0209
𝑁 1700 827 873 1700 827 873
(𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0347 −0.116 0.32 0.0551 0.0495 +0
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑(5,19) 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑(20,39)
(𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝐴𝑙𝑙) (𝑁𝐼 ↓) (𝑁𝐼 ↑)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0893 0.167* −0.0005 0.0185 0.0199 0.0273
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 0.0003 0.0031 0.0028 −0.0067* −0.0067 −0.0052
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.0288*** 0.0216** 0.0399*** 0.0092 0.0214** 0.0024
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 −0.0001** −0 −0.0001* −0 −0 +0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 +0
** +0** +0 +0 0.0001** −0
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.0181 0.0699 −0.0667 −0.0668 −0.127 0.0202
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 −0.0319 0.0063 −0.0761* −0.065** −0.0723 −0.0593
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 0.0001 – – 0.0545** – –
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 0.0979 0.772 −0.548 2.12*** 3.7*** 0.319
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 0.0358 0.0434 0.0202 0.0564** 0.0946** 0.0121
𝑟𝑜𝑎 0.024 0.705 −1.01* 1.55*** 1.58*** 1.36**
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 −0.0067 −0.0261 −0.0135 0.0622 −0.0027 0.128
𝑅2 0.029 0.0344 0.0379 0.0247 0.0473 0.0132
𝑁 1700 827 873 1700 827 873
(𝑁𝐼 ↑) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑) Diff (𝜒2)
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.114 0.25** 0.58 0.0153 0.0869 0.11
This table shows the results of the test of Hypothesis 3, using regression equations (2.3) and and (2.4), but with a
dependent variable of cumulative shares sold, over four windows. In the top portion of all windows, the columns present results
for the full sample, firms with increased net income for the quarter, and firms with decreased net income for the quarter. The
bottom portion presents results when splitting the decreasing net income sample by the median of disclosure distance, with the
third column denoting a Wald test for the difference in coefficient values (𝜒2(1)). Variable definitions are available in Appendix
B. All regressions include year times GICS sector fixed effects. Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: ***
denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.
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Table 2.7: Mitigation of strategic disclosure channel choice effects
Panel A: Liquidity
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↑) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↓) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↑) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↓) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↑) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↓) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↑) (𝐿𝑖𝑞 ↓)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0095 0.0397 0.0113 0.0127 −0.0225 −0.0247 0.0129 >> −0.0656**
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0004 −0.0008 0.0007 −0.0004 0.0002 −0.0017 −0.0003 << 0.0041**
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0025 0.0509 0.0295* 0.0274 −0.0524* −0.0269 −0.0013 > −0.0842**
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 +0 0.0014 > −0.0033 −0.0007 < 0.0051*
Panel B: Institutional ownership
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↑) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↑) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↑) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↓) (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 ↑)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0312 0.0275 0.0136 −0.0006 −0.0246 −0.0202 −0.055* −0.0093
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 0.0007 −0.0021* 0.0006 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0006 0.0038** >> −0.001
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0433 0.0306 0.0224 0.0228 0.0193 −0.0481* −0.0964** << 0.0076
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 0.0009 −0.0015 0.0003 −0.0002 0.0018 −0.0024 0.0042 0.0006
Panel C: Ownership concentration
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↓) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↑) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↓) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↑) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↓) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↑) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↓) (𝐻𝐻𝐼 ↑)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0037 0.049* 0.0148 0.0082 −0.0138 −0.0335 −0.0028 >> −0.0745**
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0012 0.0006 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0009 −0.0016 −0.0018 <<< 0.0059***
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0092 0.0436 0.0273 0.0278 −0.0274 −0.0184 −0.0166 −0.0936**
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0005 0.0006 0.0009 −0.0016 0.0013 −0.0025 −0.0005 << 0.0057**
Continued on the next page
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Table 2.7: Mitigation of strategic disclosure channel choice effects (Continued)
Panel D: News coverage
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 ↑)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.124*** <<< 0.0861** 0.0488* 0.0045 −0.001 0.0313 −0.0049 −0.0657
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.003 −0.0005 0.0031** >>> −0.0025* −0.0005 0.0003 −0.0005 0.001
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 −0.0452 < 0.123** 0.0533 0.0446 −0.07 < 0.0758 −0.124 −0.0827
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0034 −0.0004 0.0004 −0.0036* −0.0011 −0.0006 −0.0058 −0.0008
Panel E: Analyst coverage, 3 months (No analysts vs analysts)
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↓) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↑) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↓) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↑) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↓) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↑) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↓) (𝐴𝑛𝑎 ↑)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.018 0.0256 0.0034 0.0082 −0.0276 −0.0262 −0.0354 0.0067
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0012 0.0007 0.0011 >> −0.0013* −0.0014 0.0002 0.0007 0.0033**
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0063 0.05 0.0308 0.0142 −0.0294 −0.0479 −0.0652* −0.0162
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0013 0.0013 0.0026** >>> −0.0025** −0.003 << 0.0026 0.002 0.005**
Panel F: Industry disclosure contagion, 1 month
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
(𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↑) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↓) (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 ↑)
All 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0163 0.0339 0.0083 −0.0035 0.0087 −0.0203 −0.0002 −0.0201
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0 −0.0009 0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0017 −0.0001 0.0011 0.0019
𝑛𝑖 ↓ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 0.0603* 0.0253 0.0279 −0.0131 0.0272 −0.0318 −0.0388 −0.0038
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡10 −0.0008 0.0024 0.0008 0.0002 −0.0012 −0.0014 0.0031 0.0035
This table shows the results of the tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5, using regression equations (2.3) and (2.4). Variable definitions are available in
Appendix B. All regressions include year times GICS sector fixed effects. Significance levels for t-tests are two-sided and are denoted as follows: ***
denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10. Significance levels for Wald tests (testing equality of coefficients across subsamples)
are denoted as follows: >>> and <<< denote a difference significant at 𝑝 < 0.01, >> and << denote a difference significant at 𝑝 < 0.05, and >
and < denote a difference significant at 𝑝 < 0.10.
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Table 2.8: Robustness checks
Distance Topics Return
Raw Sum 62 Pos Neg Neu Raw CAR CAPM FF3
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(−10,−1)
tone
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.022 0.022 0.0206 0.029 −0.0469* 0.0353 0.0213 −0.0006 0.0219 0.0184
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.0237 0.0234 0.0224 0.0057 −0.0718* 0.106* 0.0128 −0.0097 0.0227 0.0204
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ −0.0113 −0.0184 0.0113 −0.0948 −0.0877 0.174 −0.036 −0.0066 −0.0297 −0.031
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ 0.0527* 0.0308 0.0406 0.0216 −0.0737 0.109* 0.0375 −0.0086 0.0463* 0.0483*
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 1.85 1.02 0.43 1.75 0.02 0.13 2.36 0.01 2.78* 3.14*
dist10
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0006 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0002
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.001 0.0012 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(1,4)
tone
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.0084 0.0081 0.0038 0.0154 −0.0136 −0.0141 0.01 0.0072 0.0077 0.0086
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.0293** 0.0286** 0.0275** 0.0497** −0.0518** −0.022 0.0262* 0.0274* 0.028** 0.0317**
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ 0.042* 0.0349 0.035 0.0864* −0.0623 −0.0753 0.0307 0.0369 0.0367 0.0408*
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ 0.0199 0.0225 0.0284 0.0498 −0.0652* −0.0061 0.0355* 0.0338* 0.034* 0.0383**
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.59 0.21 0.07 0.48 +0 0.5 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
dist10
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.0012 0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
Continued on the next page
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Table 2.8: Robustness checks (Continued)
Distance Topics Return
Raw Sum 62 Pos Neg Neu Raw CAR CAPM FF3
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,19)
tone
𝐴𝑙𝑙 −0.0222 −0.0224 −0.018 −0.0414 0.0299 0.0751* −0.0127 −0.0212 −0.0214 −0.0139
𝑁𝐼 ↓ −0.0297 −0.03 −0.0298 −0.0684* 0.0294 0.154** −0.0198 −0.0239 −0.0292 −0.0192
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ −0.0451 −0.0148 −0.0026 −0.0874 0.0813 0.0792 −0.049 −0.0124 −0.0234 −0.0291
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ −0.0407 −0.03 −0.0397 −0.0655 0.0012 0.125* −0.0034 −0.0337 −0.0374 −0.0204
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.01 0.1 0.67 0.05 0.86 0.08 0.73 0.2 0.09 0.04
dist10
𝐴𝑙𝑙 −0.0008 −0.0013 −0.0002 −0.0015* −0.0013 −0.0015* −0.001 −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0007
𝑁𝐼 ↓ −0.0005 −0.0012 0.0008 −0.0015 −0.0014 −0.0024* −0.0013 −0.0009 −0.0009 −0.001
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(20,39)
tone
𝐴𝑙𝑙 −0.0256 −0.0261 −0.0129 −0.0495 0.0492 −0.0384 −0.0226 −0.0241 −0.0271 −0.0202
𝑁𝐼 ↓ −0.0408 −0.0422* −0.0265 −0.0895* 0.0619 −0.0326 −0.0303 −0.0397 −0.0442* −0.0406
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ 0.0105 0.0087 0.0171 −0.0675 −0.037 −0.0478 0.0294 0.0469 0.035 0.0471
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ −0.0397 −0.0317 −0.0438 −0.0815 0.0911 0.0075 −0.0377 −0.0533 −0.0564 −0.0555
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.86 0.62 1.46 0.02 1.68 0.08 1.49 3.51* 2.91* 3.85**
dist10
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0012 0.0008 0.0019 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.0031** 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0016 0.0022 0.0042*** 0.0017 0.0027* 0.0028* 0.0024
Continued on the next page
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Table 2.8: Robustness checks (Continued)
Distance Topics Return
Raw Sum 62 Pos Neg Neu Raw CAR CAPM FF3
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(5,39)
tone
𝐴𝑙𝑙 −0.0519** −0.0528** −0.0363 −0.0971** 0.087* 0.0216 −0.0393 −0.0476** −0.053** −0.0401
𝑁𝐼 ↓ −0.0794** −0.0813** −0.0648* −0.181*** 0.0992 0.12 −0.0599 −0.0706** −0.0832** −0.0711**
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↓ −0.0358 −0.0004 0.0158 −0.167 0.023 0.0199 −0.0224 0.0202 0.0091 0.0126
𝑁𝐼 ↓, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ↑ −0.0956* −0.0796 −0.099* −0.167* 0.117 0.133 −0.0451 −0.0895* −0.0998* −0.0839
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.63 1.26 2.63 +0 0.44 0.18 0.09 2.48 2.23 1.87
dist10
𝐴𝑙𝑙 0.0011 0.0007 0.002 −0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.001 0.0008
𝑁𝐼 ↓ 0.0037 0.0027 0.0049** 0.0007 0.0021 0.0026 0.0015 0.002 0.003 0.0022
This table summarizes many of the robustness checks discussed in Section 2.5.1. The table shows results for the periods of days −10 to −1,
days 1 to 4, days 5 to 19, days 20 to 39, and days 5 to 39. Subsamples (the rows of the table) are identical to those of Table 2.3. The first and second
columns test different distance specifications. Raw 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 refers to a distance metric using Mahalanobis distance over all JST vectors simultaneously,
whereas sum 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 uses Mahalanobis distance over each set of sentiment vectors separately, summing the 3 resulting distances. The third column
shows results when using 62 disclosure topics per sentiment instead of 15 as in the base model. The fourth through sixth columns examine results
using only one sentiment each (positive, negative, and neutral). Column 7 presents the results using buy and hold raw return, while column 8
presents the results using CAR instead of BHAR. Lastly, columns 9 and 10 present the results using other abnormal return specifications: CAPM
and the Fama-French 3 factor model. Variable definitions are available in Appendix B. Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows:
*** denotes 𝑝 < 0.01, ** denotes 𝑝 < 0.05, and * denotes 𝑝 < 0.10.
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A Analytical Variable Definitions
Disclosure definitions
𝑐𝐹𝐵 The signal cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure
𝑐′𝐹𝐵 The signal cutoff between full disclosure and withholding, 1 channel
𝑐𝑃𝐵 The signal cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding
𝐹𝐷 The Full Disclosure state
𝑁𝐼 The No Information state
𝑃𝐷 The Partial Disclosure state
𝑠 A subscript indicating a state: 𝐹𝐷, 𝑃𝐷, 𝑊 , or 𝑁𝐼
𝑊 The Withholding state
Firm definitions
𝑃0,𝑠 The expected price of the stock under disclosure choice 𝑠
𝑃1 The price of the firm in period 1
𝑝𝐺 The unconditional probability the firm is good
𝑝𝑖,𝑠 The probability the firm is good, conditional on 𝐼𝑖 and 𝑠
?¯? The number of shares available
𝑥𝑖,𝑠 The number of shares per investor demanded by type 𝑖 in state 𝑠
𝜇𝐵 The unconditional expected value of a bad firm
𝜇𝐺 The unconditional expected value of a good firm
𝜎 The shared standard deviation of the good and bad firm’s payoffs
𝜎𝐵 The standard deviation of the bad firm’s payoff
𝜎𝐺 The standard deviation of the good firm’s payoff
Investor definitions
𝑎 The coefficient of risk aversion for investors
𝐼 Informed investors
𝑖 A subscript indicating investor type: 𝐼 or 𝑈
𝐼𝑖 The information set of investor type 𝑖
𝑁 The number of investors
𝑁𝐼 The number of informed investors
𝑁𝑈 The number of uninformed investors
Continued on next page
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Investor definitions (Continued)
𝑈 Uninformed investors
𝑊0 Investor wealth at time 0
?˜?1,𝑖 The investor wealth process at time 1
Manager definitions
𝑝 The probability the manager receives a signal
𝑦 The random signal of firm value received by the manager
Other definitions
𝑅𝑓 The risk-free rate
𝛽𝑥,𝑘
𝑥−𝜇𝑘
𝜎𝑘
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B Archival Variable Definitions
Return variables
𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 Abnormal return on day 𝑡, where day 0 is defined as the day the
SEC filing 𝑗 was released. Returns are calculated following the
market model. For beta calculation, 6 months of daily data are
used, from month −7 through month −1.
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑗,(𝑡,𝑇 ) Buy and hold abnormal returns from day 𝑡 through day 𝑇 , where
day 0 is defined as the day that the SEC filing 𝑗 was released.
Returns are calculated following the market model. For beta cal-
culation, 6 months of daily data are used, from month −7 through
month −1.
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗,(𝑡,𝑇 ) Cumulative percent of share sold from day 𝑡 through day 𝑇 , where
day 0 is defined as the day that the SEC filing 𝑗 was released.
Independent variables
∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 A measure of the difference in tone between the firm’s website up-
dates and the voluntary disclosures through the firm’s SEC filing.
Defined in equation (2.1).
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 A Mahalanobis distance based measure of the distance between the
disclosure content on a firm’s website and a firm’s SEC filings. It
is defined in equation (2.2).
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 The percentage of shares held by the CEO during the year the filing
was released.
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 The number of unexercised exercisable options held by the CEO
during the fiscal year the filing was released, divided by 1,000.
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 Daily price impact from Amihud (2002) following Lang & Maffett
(2011) from 5 weeks prior to the filing date up to 1 week prior to
the filing date.
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 The percent of shares owned by institutional shareholders managing
over $100M in assets.
𝐻𝐻𝐼 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of stock ownership from Thomson
Reuters 13F.
Continued on next page
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Independent variables (Continued)
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑀 The weighted percentage of text in newspaper articles over the
month before the filing date about a firm that is positive minus
the percentage that is negative.
𝐴𝑛𝑎 The number of distinct analysts releasing an annual or quarterly
EPS forecast about the firm in event 𝑗 in the 3 months leading up
to the SEC filing date.
𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶 The average tone difference (∆𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒) of all firms in the same industry
as the firm in event 𝑗 over the 4 weeks prior to the filing date.
Control variables
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 Natural logarithm of the most recently disclosed amount of total
assets.
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐹 The amount of voluntary disclosure released via a firm’s 10-K or
10-Q filing.
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑊 The amount of voluntary disclosure released via a firm’s website in
a month.
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ The percentage increase in revenue quarter-over-quarter, divided
by 100.
𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑎 Long term debt divided by long term assets.
𝑛𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑐 An indicator variable equal to 1 if net income in the current quarter
is less than net income in the previous quarter.
𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 Research and development expense divided by total assets. Set to
0 if missing.
𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 An indicator variable set to 1 if 𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝 is missing, 0 otherwise.
𝑟𝑜𝑎 Return on assets, defined as net income divided by assets.
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C Voluntary Disclosure Cutoff
Simulations
In order to determine the optimal cutoff points to use for distinguishing mandatory disclo-
sures from voluntary disclosures, a simulation was used. For both simulations below, 100
companies are randomly selected from which four filings of sufficient length are selected (less
if there are less than 4 filings available). Each simulation uses a different sample. The goal
of the simulation is to determine how sentences are related across these documents. Consid-
ering the trade-off between the cutoff chosen and the percentage of sentences retained, it is
expected that there is an inflection point at which the number of sentences retained begins
to drop steeply after previously dropping at a decreasing rate. In each simulation, this is
identified as the inflection point at the highest cutoff such that the third derivative of the
model fit to the data is negative.
For the first simulation, a set of four prior filings were chosen to match each of the 386
chosen filings (92 10-K filings, 294 10-Q filings). After choosing a filing, each percentage
cutoff from 0.01 to 0.99 is tried. Sentences in the filing that fall below the cutoff at least
once when compared against the sentences in the set of prior filings are removed. Then, the
percentage of sentences remaining is calculated. This process is repeated for all 386 filings.
Next, a regression is fit to the data. While the data is generally polynomial in appearance
(see graphs below), the right tail asymptotes to 0. To prevent this from skewing the regres-
sion, polynomial regressions are run for data sets starting at 0.01 with an upper limit at 0.70
through 0.99. Polynomial functions whose inflection points are not real valued are ignored.
Based on these regressions, the lowest degree polynomial that reasonably fits the data is
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of degree seven for both 10-K filings and 10-Q filings. Furthermore, the optimal seventh
degree polynomial is chosen by taking the data range with the highest cutoff for the highest
cutoff with a negative 3rd derivative. This leads to the most conservative optimal cutoff,
as the higher the cutoff, the less likely that mandatory disclosure, as proxied by company
boilerplate language, will be in the remaining sentences. The cutoff found for 10-K filings is
0.573914, and the cutoff found for 10-Q filings is 0.557982. A graph of the chosen functions
and the underlying data is presented below.
Simulation 1
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For the second simulation, a set of three contemporaneous filings were chosen to match
each of the 379 chosen filings (83 10-K filings and 296 10-Q filings). The contemporaneous
filings of each filing are restricted to be outside the GICS sector of the filing, allowing the set
to capture new potential disclosure requirements while not removing potentially correlated
voluntary disclosures within industry. Also, the contemporaneous filings are not allowed to
be in the banking and finance GICS sector (40), as the disclosure requirements for banks are
likely to be quite different from other industries. After choosing a filing, the filing is processed
following the optimal cutoff from the first simulation using a set of four prior filings. Each
percentage cutoff from 0.01 to 0.99 is tried with respect to the contemporaneous filings.
Sentences in the filing that fall below the cutoff at least once when compared against the
sentences in the set of contemporaneous filings are removed, and the percentage of sentences
remaining is calculated. This process is repeated for all 379 filings.
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In a method similar to the first simulation, a polynomial regression is again fit to the
data (see figures below). Like in the first simulation, both 10-K and 10-Q filings appear to
follow a polynomial of degree seven. The cutoff is chosen in a manner identical to the first
simulation, yielding a cutoff of 0.563468 for 10-K filings and a cutoff of 0.562687 for 10-Q
filings.
Simulation 2
10-K 10-Q
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Mandatory
Voluntary
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Mandatory
Voluntary
Polynomial regression models
Simulation Cutoff Adj-𝑅2 Bounds Best fit model
1 10-K 0.573914 0.999362 0.01 0.88 0.512715 − 0.822736𝑥 − 3.67848𝑥2 +
41.3503𝑥3 − 149.548𝑥4 + 261.757𝑥5 −
222.821𝑥6 + 73.2037𝑥7
1 10-Q 0.557982 0.999585 0.01 0.90 0.468573 − 1.29429𝑥 − 1.17293𝑥2 +
33.7009𝑥3 − 134.415𝑥4 + 243.584𝑥5 −
212.240𝑥6 + 71.5717𝑥7
2 10-K 0.563468 0.998532 0.01 0.84 0.986861 + 0.380717𝑥 − 6.78491𝑥2 +
43.9990𝑥3 − 136.271𝑥4 + 208.898𝑥5 −
145.500𝑥6 + 31.1881𝑥7
2 10-Q 0.562687 0.998343 0.01 0.86 0.986355 + 0.553328𝑥 − 8.93808𝑥2 +
57.5760𝑥3 − 181.488𝑥4 + 291.033𝑥5 −
222.729𝑥6 + 60.7890𝑥7
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D Number of Topics per Sentiment
In order to run the JST algorithm, the algorithm must be supplied with the number of topics
to find in the data. Given a parameter for the number of topics, the algorithm will find that
many topics for each sentiment. In order to determine the optimal number of topics, multiple
methodologies were employed. First, a random sample of 2,000 processed documents was
selected. The JST algorithm was run for a number of topics per sentiment in increments of
5 from 5 to 90, using the same process as described in Section 2.3.3. Based on this first pass,
it was identified that the optimal number of topics was either between 2 and 25 or 60 and
85.
To determine the optimal number of topics, two measures of optimality were employed.
Let 𝐽 be the 𝑤 × 𝑡 word-topic matrix obtained by the JST algorithm and normalizing
the matrix to have rows of length 1 under a Euclidean distance metric. The first measure
employed was the condition number test. This test is defined as 𝐶𝑁 = |𝐽𝐽𝑇 |/|(𝐽𝐽𝑇 )−1|. This
test indicates significant issues with multicollinearity across topics if 𝐶𝑁 > 30. However, the
lower 𝐶𝑁 , the less multicollinearity that is expected. Balancing this with a theoretical desire
to have a greater number of topics, 15 appears to be optimal, as it has the lowest condition
number of any number of topics above 8, and actually represents the lowest condition number
except when using 2 or 8 topics. The optimal point is illustrated in the figure below.
The second measure employed is a volume method. This method is based on a geometric
interpretation of the determinant of 𝐽𝐽𝑇 . In particular, the determinant represents a the
volume of parallelepiped with sides defined by the row vectors of the matrix 𝐽 . If all row
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vectors are orthogonal, then the the determinant will be 1, as the underlying geometric figure
will simply be a 𝑡 dimensional hypercube. If, however, any two dimensions are identical, then
the determinant collapses to 0. Using this test, an optimal choice of 15 topics is again chosen.
While the volume is slightly higher for 6, 9, and 11 topics, and much higher for 4 or less
topics along with 7 and 8 topics, the benefit of having more topics should outweigh these
differences. When looking at a number of topics above 15, there is a steady decline in the
volume. The optimal point is illustrated in the figure below.
Optimization of number of topics per sentiment: Condition number and volume tests
This figure plots the condition numbers and volumes obtained via simulation for different numbers of
topics, ranging from 1 to 100. Condition number is plotted as a solid line against the left axis, while volume
is plotted as a dashed line against the right axis. The two circles indicate the condition number and volume
at the optimal number of topics, 15.
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E Topics
This section presents summary information for each of the topic-sentiment distributions
from the JST algorithm. The top 10 stemmed words for each topic are presented. As the
words are stemmed, some words will have different spellings (e.g., ‘properti’ as opposed to
‘property’), while other words will be missing the end of the word (e.g., ‘manager’ becomes
‘manag’). By stemming the words, the algorithm is better able to see associations between
words without getting hung up on similar words (such as ‘manager’ and ‘managers’). Note
that positive sentiment topic 𝑛 is not necessarily related to negative sentiment topic 𝑛. The
topic numbers are simply included as identifiers from the algorithm.
Combined topics
Topic Neutral Positive Negative
1) report, form, k, file, inform, refer,
incorpor, registr, annual, item
sale, higher, segment, busi, percent,
compar, declin, product, growth,
improv
corpor, merger, date, plan, home,
subsidiari, agreement, reorgan,
common, nation
2) store, retail, game, new, merchan-
dis, open, brand, card, facil, credit
incom, consolid, share, note, tax,
thousand, secur, earn, balanc, sub-
sidiari
advers, futur, addit, market, affect,
abil, stock, materi, condit, price
3) vehicl, aircraft, fuel, leas, revenu,
transport, equip, vessel, fleet, truck
court, power, file, order, state, issu,
effect, provid, appeal, defend
facil, industri, materi, manufactur,
environment, use, price, steel, seg-
ment, site
4) june, second, decreas, revenu, com-
par, juli, primarili, sale, approxim,
current
tax, benefit, plan, incom, asset,
valu, rate, estim, defer, fair
foreign, currenc, exchang, dollar,
intern, unit, subsidiari, tax, rate,
global
5) network, revenu, advertis, wireless,
communic, market, media, televis,
cabl, program
invest, secur, valu, fair, market, as-
set, fund, incom, manag, portfolio
rate, deriv, hedg, credit, risk, con-
tract, instrument, chang, swap,
million
6) power, texa, fuel, southern,
louisiana, gulf, state, georgia,
duke, plant
product, sale, custom, market,
manufactur, inventori, busi, dis-
tribut, sell, price
claim, action, settlement, alleg,
plaintiff, litig, complaint, district,
file, certain
Continued on next page
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Combined topics (Continued)
Topic Neutral Positive Negative
7) offic, director, execut, board,
presid, agreement, committe,
manag, chief, serv
health, care, medic, servic, provid,
program, patient, hospit, state,
medicar
stock, share, common, price, war-
rant, issu, purchas, date, convert,
seri
8) mine, coal, water, properti, gold,
price, plant, miner, explor, project
natur, capit, valu, signific, futur,
project, effect, time, estim, busi
fiscal, sale, base, approxim, leas,
date, januari, februari, gross, com-
mon
9) loan, bank, rate, deposit, mortgag,
credit, risk, capit, feder, loss
acquisit, valu, asset, fair, acquir,
goodwil, busi, intang, purchas, es-
tim
contract, system, project, revenu,
complet, govern, program, work,
perform, construct
10) energi, electr, gas, generat, util,
custom, rate, servic, regulatori,
suppli
product, develop, clinic, patent, re-
search, approv, licens, trial, agree-
ment, drug
insur, loss, claim, polici, reserv, life,
rate, risk, decemb, invest
11) restaur, hotel, franchis, food, week,
franchise, manag, revenu, resort,
own
note, agreement, facil, credit, se-
nior, secur, debt, prefer, outstand,
term
decemb, base, leas, approxim, term,
asset, sale, liabil, common, capit
12) properti, leas, real, estat, ventur,
develop, joint, partnership, invest,
loan
product, technolog, develop, cus-
tom, manufactur, market, system,
use, patent, design
march, decreas, april, primarili,
compar, revenu, sale, condens, ac-
tiv, rate
13) shall, agreement, section, agent,
day, parti, notic, term, person, ex-
ecut
stock, option, compens, grant,
plan, share, valu, award, employe,
vest
base, report, control, requir, lia-
bil, impair, estim, disclosur, mea-
sur, evalu
14) partnership, unit, partner, pipelin,
gas, general, distribut, storag, facil,
oil
servic, revenu, custom, busi,
provid, softwar, product, manag,
technolog, develop
million, decreas, primarili, lower,
charg, incom, tax, offset, averag,
sale
15) septemb, revenu, decreas, octob,
compar, credit, primarili, sale, rate,
approxim
busi, requir, regul, state, secur,
provid, servic, law, time, act
gas, oil, product, drill, price, reserv,
properti, well, explor, produc
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